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Abstract 
The conceptual metaphor FUTURE IS IN FRONT and its psychological reality 
The conceptual metaphor is a phenomenon where one conceptual domain, the source domain, 
is cognitively mapped onto another, the target domain, which enables human conceptualization 
of otherwise less accessible, perceptually less salient domains. In English, FUTURE IS IN 
FRONT is a conceptual metaphor by means of which the observable source domain of “in front” 
is mapped onto the abstract target domain of “future”. Following the classical theory of 
conceptual metaphor (especially by Lakoff and Johnson), the metaphorical expressions of 
FUTURE IS IN FRONT and its submetaphors are given in this thesis. Evidence of its 
psychological reality is shown through research on the comprehension of novel metaphorical 
expressions based on this conceptual metaphor. Finally, the scope of relevance of this particular 
conceptual metaphor for the conceptualization of the future by native speakers of English is 
discussed––both for lexical items expressing the future as well as for the grammatical means of 
encoding it.  
 
Keywords: conceptual metaphor, submetaphor, the future, in front, psychological reality. 
 
Izvleček 
Konceptualna metafora PRIHODNOST JE SPREDAJ ter njena psihološka realnost 
Pri konceptualni metafori gre za kognitivno preslikavanje ene izmed konceptualnih domen – 
izhodiščne domene – na drugo, torej ciljno domeno. Takšne preslikave ljudem omogočajo 
miselno dostopanje do domen, ki bi jim, ker so čutom manj zaznavne ali nezaznavne, sicer bile 
le stežka dostopne. V angleščini konceptualna metafora PRIHODNOST JE SPREDAJ 
omogoča preslikavo izhodiščne domene “spredaj”, ki jo lahko zaznavamo z očmi, na abstraktno 
ciljno domeno “prihodnost”. V magistrskem delu sledim klasični teoriji konceptualne metafore 
(še posebej delom Lakoffa in Johnsona) ter podam metaforične izraze, osnovane na 
PRIHODNOST JE SPREDAJ, pa njenih podmetaforah. Potem pokažem, da je na osnovi testa 
razumevanja izvirnih metaforičnih izrazov, osnovanih na tej metafori, mogoče zagovarjati, da 
je metafora psihološko realna. Nazadnje razpravljam še o nujnosti dotične metafore za 
konceptualizacijo prihodnosti pri maternih govorcih angleščine, in sicer tako za lekseme, ki se 
tičejo prihodnosti, kot tudi za slovnične strukture, s katerimi je prihodnost mogoče uvezovati. 
 
Ključne besede: konceptualna metafora, podmetafora, prihodnost, spredaj, psihološka 
realnost. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
To understand where language comes from and what it is influenced by has been a longstanding 
pursuit of thinkers and scholars. Some of the answers they have provided locate the source of 
language in a supreme being, in the system of signs, or in the human brain. The object of 
investigation with which the present thesis is concerned is one of the phenomena relevant for 
the study of language if language does indeed originate from the human brain: the conceptual 
metaphor. In particular, this thesis explores the conceptual metaphor linking the idea of events 
happening after a certain reference point––the future––and the observation that a certain object, 
usually a thing, is located physically in front of the active area of another, which also serves as 
the reference point. Consider, for example, expressions like “Christmas is approaching” and 
“In the long run, we are going to have to face the fact that the time to confront climate change 
has come.” The italicized items would typically refer to space, in particular the space in front 
of someone. Here, however, they refer to time, in particular the future.  
The thesis offers an answer to questions like: “Why do parts of actual language performance, 
or linguistic usage, which people normally produce to say that something is in front of 
something else, also mean that an event is going to happen at a future time relative to some 
other event?” or “If we accept that there are similar expressions being used both for being 
physically in front and for being in the future, why should future be expressed specifically by 
those expressions, the ones pertaining to being in front?” The idea is not to claim that this thesis 
can offer an unequivocal answer; however, one of the advantages of the approach used here is 
that it refuses to take for granted any assumptions about language, and instead examines 
linguistic phenomena both from the point-of-view of language as well as the brain.  
This approach is called “cognitive linguistics”. It is typically associated with names such as 
George Lakoff, Ronald Langacker, Günter Radden, Rene Dirven and Gilles Fauconnier, among 
many others1. It is one of those approaches which claim that language is indeed connected with 
the human brain, but remains distinct from the generative approach founded by Noam Chomsky 
in that it argues that there is no specific apparatus in the brain which is the sole organ responsible 
for language comprehension and production. Instead, drawing on what has been termed 
experientialism by Mark Johnson (1987; 2003 with Lakoff), it is not the brain itself but the 
entire body which is involved in language production, reception, and comprehension. This is 
done, for example, by processing the input from our surroundings, by processing our bodily 
                                                          
1 The list is not meant to be exhaustive. 
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reactions to the input, and also by making use of the devices with which human beings are 
biologically endowed. (Notice how this involves our senses, our peripheral nervous system as 
well as out central nervous system: the brain and the spinal cord.) Researching language as a 
phenomenon inextricably connected with cognition has so far yielded breakthroughs in 
semantics (Lakoff 1987; Lakoff and Turner 1989, etc.), syntax (Ronald Langacker), diachronic 
analysis (Sweetser 1995) etc. (See also Kövecses 2006.)  
In cognitive linguistics, the theory of conceptual metaphor is of central importance. Briefly, 
“Metaphor allows people to understand one thing as another, without thinking that the two 
things are objectively the same.” (Sweetser 1995, 8) In other words, it allows us to understand 
one concept (Sweetser used “thing”) and the notions to which it is closely related, in terms of 
another, structurally similar concept. In the case here, “future” is being understood in terms of 
“being in front”. Thus, one can “face” the future or “confront” it whereas the future itself may 
be “approaching”, “slowly moving closer” or even “far off”.  
There is a crucial component to the theory of conceptual metaphor that needs to be explicated: 
metaphor isn’t just ‘another’ way to think about a concept. Rather, the concept itself cannot be 
understood in any other way but through metaphor. Linking what we can understand through 
metaphor to another concept is how we have come to understand, and continue to understand 
this other, only indirectly familiar concept in the first place. The claim is, therefore, that English 
speakers (alongside speakers of a whole host of other languages) understand the future both 
because and in the same way as they understand a spatial arrangement of something being in 
front of something else.  
Naturally, “future” and “being in front” are not the only two concepts linked through conceptual 
metaphor. It is also not a coincidence that human beings can see what is in front of them, or 
something else, and that it is precisely the arrangement which they see that has become a source 
of expressions for the arrangement in time, which one cannot see. It is also the case that “being 
in front” does not provide “future” only with its expressions, but should, if the theory of 
conceptual metaphor is correct, also provide “future” with the way in which people are able to 
understand it: its cognitive structure. Those are two different but connected realities. If one 
studies linguistic expressions alone and finds patterns governing how they are arranged in 
meaningful segments, such as subject-predicator agreement or adjectives premodifying nouns, 
the processes can be said to have linguistic reality. On the other hand, if one studies cognition 
and finds patterns with manifest effects on what cognition produces, those processes can be 
said to have psychological reality. The main concern of this thesis is obviously language and 
linguistic reality, but since the matter at hand is conceptual metaphor whose essential theoretical 
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tenet is that it has both a linguistic and a psychological reality, it is necessary to also consider 
the latter.  
In light of that, it needs to be said that while studies of conceptual metaphor do normally 
emphasize that conceptual metaphors are matter of both language and cognition, they, firstly, 
differ greatly when it comes to the details of how precisely they work, and, secondly, typically 
offer either only linguistic proof or only psychological proof. I believe that by doing so, they 
do not do justice to their own claims and give undue preference to one type of knowledge, 
which leaves us with very reasonable but not entirely sufficient answers if we really want to 
know how our brains and our languages cooperate. The objective of this thesis is therefore as 
follows. Always having in mind a specific conceptual metaphor linking “future” and “being in 
front” (Henceforth: FUTURE IS IN FRONT2), to describe as accurately as possible how this 
metaphor works, to understand and describe what concrete repercussions this has for our 
language and our mind, to find and systematically describe the material indices of these 
repercussions (in case of language, expressions based on FUTURE IS IN FRONT; in case of 
cognition, indications that FUTURE IS IN FRONT is psychologically real), and to draw 
conclusions from the findings of experiments. 
The thesis is structured in the following manner. Section 2 defines the terms relevant for the 
study of conceptual metaphors, as well as defines both “conceptual metaphor” and 
“psychological reality” in greater detail than this introduction has. It also posits some research 
questions to be answered in the conclusion. Section 3 reviews the classical literature on 
conceptual metaphor, discusses the ambiguities and relative shortcomings of some approaches, 
and searches for solutions to seemingly insurmountable problems both in the earlier writings 
on the matter as well as some contemporary literature. It also discusses how language on its 
own can be a reliable index of psychological reality, since it is impossible here to conduct 
research using actual brain scanners. This is both applied in section 4, which describes the 
methodology for determining the psychological reality of FUTURE IS IN FRONT. More 
specifically, it describes how corpora and surveys can be used to determine psychological 
reality. In section 5, I present the results of the experiments described in the previous section. 
This is followed by an extensive discussion in section 6. Section 7 revisits the research questions 
from section 2 and offers some concluding remarks. 
  
                                                          
2 It is customary to put down conceptual metaphors as a two elements connected by a copula, written in 
uppercase, so that the target domain is the subject and the source domain is the complement. This custom is 
observed throughout the thesis.  
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2. DEFINITIONS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
Following Lakoff and Johnson 2003, Lakoff 1987; 1993 in Ortony (ed.), Sweetser 1995, 
Johnson 1987 and so on, whenever the term “metaphor” is used here, what is meant is the 
conceptual metaphor, as opposed to literary metaphor. Literary metaphor, like conceptual 
metaphor, also makes one understand one idea in terms of another because of their pre-existing 
similarity along a certain dimension, but this link is different from the conceptual one. Above 
all, literary metaphor is an “embellishment” of regular language, in the sense that what is 
expressed and understood through such metaphors could quite feasibly have been expressed 
and understood in a different manner. When Shakespeare’s poetic persona compares someone 
to a summer’s day, this does not mean that the persona and Shakespeare are able to grasp the 
concept of the radiant, lovely, and temperate addressee only by means of this very metaphor. 
(Incidentally, this is proven also by Sonnet 130’s line “My mistress’ eyes are nothing like the 
sun,” which contradicts the previous metaphor!) This person might have easily been perceived 
as a sun-drenched garden, or an enchanting stranger. Additionally, all the qualities the persona 
extols in the addressee could just as likely have been perceived by a Berber in Mauritania or an 
Inuit in Nunavut, even though summer days objectively mean completely different things to 
them. The point is, literary metaphor is used to convey a person’s internal state and is not 
essential for understanding as such. It is also relatively temporary (limited to a certain body of 
poetic works), possibly more difficult to grasp than what is being referred to with the 
metaphorical expression, and therefore a phenomenon not typical of everyday regular 
cognition. On top of that, Lakoff and Turner 1989 have shown that most literary metaphors are 
based on conceptual ones, because it is the latter variant that is more fundamental for thought.  
What, then, is metaphor––the conceptual variant? Lakoff (1987, 386) describes the structure of 
a metaphor as “a set of correspondences between a source domain and a target domain.” While 
metaphors are conceptual in nature, they are manifest in linguistic performance, and hence 
“contemporary metaphor theorists commonly use the term ‘metaphor’ to refer to the conceptual 
mapping, and the term ‘metaphorical expression’ to refer to an individual linguistic expression 
[…] that is sanctioned by the mapping.” (Lakoff in Ortony (ed.) 1993, 209) The 
correspondences “[require] going beyond the predictable-arbitrary dichotomy. [They require] 
introducing the concept of motivation,” (Lakoff 1987, 438; emphasis in the original) which is 
most concisely described as “something beyond the linguist’s intuition that these senses are 
9 
 
related, or that these two senses are more closely related than either is to a third sense.” 
(Sweetser, 3)  
Because they unavoidably link thought and language, metaphors also have a semantic reality to 
go with the structural one, namely in terms of how “[n]ew metaphors have the power to create 
new reality. This can begin to happen when we start to comprehend our experience in terms of 
a metaphor, [which] becomes a deeper reality when we begin to act in terms of it.” (Lakoff and 
Johnson 2003, 145).  
First, let us focus on “source domain”, “target domain”, and “mapping”. These are the 
fundamental concepts for understanding metaphor. Without going too much into detail, let us 
accept the claim first put forth by Eleanor Rosch and then taken up by Lakoff and Johnson, that 
human knowledge is categorized in terms of prototypes and then organized in terms of 
“domains,” which are stable subsystems of knowledge and information related to categories 
where one category is differentiated from the other by possessing the most properties maximally 
distinct from those of the neighbouring categories. We know that domains are formed by human 
experience of observing the world, as well as by culturally transmitted knowledge. Because 
some of our surroundings is easier to observe and generalize about than the rest, it follows that 
some domains form more easily than others. This is where metaphors come in: one domain, the 
source domain (henceforth: SD) contains readily available knowledge humans acquire by some 
interaction with the environment. Other domains, which are quintessential for the functioning 
of any culture, like the culturally determined idea of time, life, mind and so on, cannot be 
acquired solely by interacting with the environment. However, new domains can be formed by 
drawing similarities with the existing, more easily graspable ones. Thus, a target domain (TD) 
is a domain which is in some way structurally similar to the SD, but one that can exist only 
because of its correspondences with the structure of the SD. While the structure of SD is 
received from the environment, the structure of TD is projected from one (or more) of the 
existing SDs. This projection of correspondences is what is meant by “mapping.”  
Second, it is necessary to understand the concept of “motivation”. In his work, Lakoff describes 
phenomena going beyond the dichotomy of arbitrary versus predictable. A predictable item is 
distributed in language according to linguistic rules; by knowing the rules, one will use the item 
so that one produces grammatically correct sentences, barring any random mistakes. Thus, in 
English, articles predictably introduce nominal phrases, anaphora predictably agree with their 
antecedents in person and number, etc. On the other hand, arbitrariness is a quality of haphazard 
distribution. Disregarding collocational preference, any noun, nominal phrase, nominal clause 
or nominalized adjective or even an elided nominal head may be the object to a preposition in 
10 
 
an English prepositional phrase. However, since one may not just disregard collocational 
preference, it is obvious that there is a category between arbitrary and predictable. In the sense 
chosen by Lakoff and which is relevant to the study of metaphor, there is external 
(extralinguistic) impetus for some linguistic items to appear together more frequently than 
arbitrary distribution would allow, but not as consistently to warrant a description of a rule. The 
source of this motivation varies from metaphor to metaphor, but typical sources include gestalt 
structures, ease of perception, concreteness of SD, etc. Correspondences between SDs and 
appropriate TDs are therefore described as “motivated”.  
Third, what gives metaphors the power to create new reality is the ability of the human brain to 
redirect the mapping both from a SD as well as to a TD. An example of the former would be 
the emergence of a new domain due to a technological or scientific breakthrough. Humans 
generally understand little about computers, but have to use them every day. Because this is 
typically done in an office, much of human interaction has come to be understood in terms of 
office activities and supplies: we copy, paste, write in a notepad, discard what is no longer 
needed into a recycle bin, send around documents via (e-)mail and so on, even though activities 
described above are all quite distinct from traditional office work. As an example of finding a 
new SD for a TD, Lakoff and Johnson 2003 suggest the Americanization of different cultures 
by introducing the TIME IS MONEY metaphor: feeling like one’s time is valuable or wasted 
is now practically a ubiquitous feeling in the world (Lakoff and Johnson 2003, 145). A scientific 
conceptual shift is described in Johnson 1987, 127ff: a scientist could not understand why a rat 
was developing identical symptoms even when toxins were being injected into completely 
distinct parts of its body. Because he was thinking of the body in terms of the BODY IS A 
MACHINE metaphor, he was under the influence of the idea that a malfunction of a particular 
body part would cause a unique defect in the body, similarly to how machines malfunction. 
Only once he shifted his understanding to the BODY IS A HOMEOSTATIC ORGANISM 
metaphor did he realize that the same symptoms were in fact caused by psychological stress 
brought about by his constant pestering of the poor creature.  
Finally, some brief remarks regarding psychological reality. Lakoff and Johnson 2003, Johnson 
1987, Lakoff 1987, Lakoff in Ortony (ed.) 1993, Lakoff and Turner 1989, Barcelona (ed.) 2000, 
and Sweetser 1995 all contain passages in which authors agree that metaphors are primarily a 
matter of thought, and only consequently of language. To say then that metaphor is 
psychologically real is to say there is actual correspondence between the given SD and TD. Of 
the authors listed above, only Johnson is explicitly concerned with whether or not the mappings 
he describes actually exist or not (1987, 102). The others, despite their admission, are satisfied 
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with systematic correspondences between the two domains in attested linguistic examples––
which, as was mentioned above, pertains not to metaphor as such, but only to metaphorical 
expressions. As Vyvyan Evans insightfully points out, “[Lakoff and Johnson] use language to 
infer the existence of conceptual metaphors. They claim that conceptual metaphors […] must 
exist, because this is what language appears to be telling us.” (Evans 2014, 184; emphasis in 
the original) That is not to say, however, that linguistic methods for discovering indices of the 
psychological reality of metaphor (as opposed to metaphorical expressions) cannot be devised, 
nor does it mean that the means for devising such methods are not present in the works 
mentioned here. This will be discussed at length in section 4. 
The works mentioned here all belong to the “classical” theory of metaphor. While the matter of 
research here is only FUTURE IS IN FRONT, this metaphor obviously works according to the 
same principles as other metaphors (notwithstanding the specifics which have to do with how 
it is motivated), and, consequently, discoveries from that field of studies must be interpolated 
into the research on this particular metaphor, not the other way around. This is why frequent 
reference will be made to FUTURE IS IN FRONT in sections 3 and 4, but only insofar as the 
references and the generalizations about metaphor work hand-in-hand. The psychological 
reality of FUTURE IS IN FRONT is not a phenomenon sui generis and neither are the 
consequences of early theory of metaphor or contemporary discoveries from the field.  
In light of that, I propose the following research questions, all pertaining to FUTURE IS IN 
FRONT, but all possibly applicable to any other metaphor. 
RQ1: Is FUTURE IS IN FRONT a psychologically real metaphor and how is it possible to 
determine this? 
RQ2: What concrete manifestations, meaning metaphorical expressions, of FUTURE IS IN 
FRONT are used by speakers of English? 
RQ3: Is FUTURE IS IN FRONT irrelevant, conducive, or essential towards the English 
speakers’ understanding of the concept of “future”? 
RQ1, RQ2 and RQ3 will be readdressed in Section 7. 
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3. THE THEORY OF METAPHOR 
 
When discussing PEOPLE ARE PLANTS, which is used in various examples of literary 
language, Lakoff and Mark Turner comment thus upon a line where a person is said to have 
withered:  
  
 “Linguistic expressions [metaphorical expressions, op. a.]––mere sequences of words  
––are not metaphors in themselves. Metaphors are conceptual mappings. They are matter of 
thought, not merely language. Part of the confusion arises because the words that 
conventionally express a source-domain [sic] concept can, in the typical case, also be used to 
express the corresponding target-domain [sic] concept, as when ‘withered’ is applied both to 
plants and people.” (Lakoff and Turner 1989, 107) 
 
This is in fact the primary theoretical issue that is at stake in the present section. Here, the well-
accepted idea that metaphor is the name for mapping of structural correspondences from a SD 
onto a similar TD is investigated from the point-of-view of two conclusions that follow from it, 
namely that metaphorical expressions are manifestations of something more basic than 
themselves, and that it is possible to find the reasons for such manifestations. In practical terms, 
language will be used to investigate metaphor. For that to be possible, it is, first, fundamental 
to understand what metaphor is, and, second, understand what it means for something to be 
psychologically real. In this way, it is possible to respect the stipulation in the sentence “Any 
discussion of the uniqueness or idiosyncrasy of a metaphor must therefore take place on two 
different levels: the conceptual level and the linguistic level.” (Ibid, 50) 
It is perhaps more informative to understand what a metaphor does before understanding what 
it is, because the latter is a collection of features rather than a thing (an object, something with 
a physical presence in our model––the real world) that can be physically interacted with. One 
thing metaphor has been described to do is change behaviour: “If a new metaphor enters the 
conceptual system that we base our actions on, it will alter that conceptual system and the 
perceptions and actions that the system gives rise to.” (Lakoff and Johnson 2003, 145) Because 
our conceptual system consists of overlapping domains, and metaphors, as has just been seen, 
affect the conceptual system, it makes sense that metaphors affect domains. Indeed, “We have 
found that metaphors allow us to understand one domain of experience in terms of another. This 
suggests that understanding takes place in terms of entire domains of experience and not in 
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terms of isolated concepts.” (Ibid, 117) This is the idea behind the division of metaphorical 
mapping into SD and TD.  
The next question is, since there are two domains before us, how does one know which domain 
is the SD. Building on their theoretical departure from the objectivist philosophy, Lakoff and 
Johnson offer almost immediately after the previous quotation the answer: the SD is 
experientially basic: “Each such domain is a structured whole within our experience that is 
conceptualized as what we have called an experiential gestalt. Such gestalts are experientially 
basic because they characterize structured wholes within recurrent human experiences.” (Ibid, 
emphases in the original)  Here, we have run into what appears to be an instance of circular 
reasoning, since a structured whole––a domain––is experientially basic because it is 
conceptualized as a gestalt, and gestalts are in turn experientially basic because they 
characterize such domains.  
This problem is solved when one learns what a gestalt is. The authors define it as “the complex 
of properties occurring together [that are] more basic to experience than their separate 
occurrence. Through their constant recurrence in our everyday functioning, the category of 
causation [causation was their example] emerges with this complex of properties characterizing 
prototypical causations.” (Ibid, 71) To recap now: in psychology, gestalts are wholes that are 
conceptually easier to process than their individual properties. The most typical gestalts in 
human minds are visual since humans usually rely on sight more than on any other sense; 
however, gestalts based on hearing and smell have also been proven to exist (Evans 2014). 
People gain access to gestalts through their interaction with the world, typically through 
observation (again, due to the relative primacy of sight), and gestalts are differentiated in the 
mind from other phenomena due to the fact that it is recurring experience that becomes a gestalt. 
A typical regular shape, like a square or an equilateral triangle, becomes a gestalt––let this be 
shown by the daring prediction that any reader will determine how big □ is by looking at it, not 
by trying to multiply the length of its side with itself in order to numerically grasp its area. 
Those human experiences which give us gestalts because they are based on physical interaction, 
then, constitute those domains which are considered more basic. Those are also the domains 
that tend to be SDs.  
In the case of FUTURE IS IN FRONT, it is obvious why IN FRONT is the SD in light of what 
was just told. Not only is it easier to understand what is in front of something else than it is to 
explain the idea of “in front” (linguists use the deictic system to do so, for example)––which 
makes “in front” a good candidate for a gestalt for the domain IN FRONT to be based on––
14 
 
humans also cannot perceive time as such. We do not possess any receptors for time, like we 
typically possess eyes for spatial awareness, and ears for sound and equilibrium. It is also 
relevant to note that time as such does not even exist: it is an abstract concept people have 
invented to say that one event has happened before, after, simultaneously to, etc. to another. 
Through time (or rather, as the sequence of all events everywhere progressed), this concept has 
become so natural to all cultures in the world that it is now impossible to exist without it, even 
though it has never been naturally given. Finally, it is also extremely difficult to describe time 
without referring either to time itself (note the “after” in one of the sentences above) or space.  
In the first paragraph of this section, I mentioned the PEOPLE ARE PLANTS metaphor. 
Objections may be raised at the suggestion that a plant is a gestalt. It is true that many people 
are consistently interacting with plants, but it is also well known that a plant is a category that 
is also prototypically organized, meaning that people who have different experiences with 
plants will tend to have (slightly) different prototypical plants in their minds. However, 
resorting again to the hypothetical Berber and Inuit, the square they imagine would be the same 
square with the same properties. Additionally, Lakoff 1987’s extensive example of ANGER IS 
HEAT may be scrutinized in the same way. Is heat a gestalt? The answer is obviously no. 
However, this does not mean that Lakoff and Johnson are wrong. While it is true that the word 
“gestalt” is typically reserved for shapes, noises and smells, they have used it in a broader sense, 
in which it subsumes all recurrent human experience based on our interaction with the world. 
For the Berber and the Inuit, the remark “It’s hot outside” objectively has two very different 
meanings. Still, once they become angry, they will both feel their body temperature rise, and 
this is so natural and therefore basic that an association is likely to be made in their minds. For 
speakers of English, Lakoff says elsewhere: “[O]rdinary speakers of English have had a very 
subtle insight into their own physiology.” (1987, 407) And while the Berber and the Inuit can 
unfortunately only be speculated about, the Briton has experienced this rise in heat enough for 
it to also bring about linguistic manifestations. Because heat is a recurrent experience, she is 
able to say she would explode, blow her top off or have steam coming out of her ears when she 
is sufficiently angry.  
Whereas in Lakoff and Johnson 2003 (originally published in 1980) they claim that gestalts are 
the basis for metaphorical mapping in general, in their later solo work, Lakoff and Johnson 
show considerable disagreement when it comes to the exact roles that gestalts play in 
metaphorical mapping.  
In Lakoff 1987, metaphorical mapping does not arise out of its own inherent properties: it is 
rather contingent on “motivation,” which will cause mapping from one domain onto another 
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when there is actually a need for such mapping. This only happens between similar domains 
whose similarity is based on human perception––those that are similar in terms of gestalts. To 
use an example from Boroditsky (2000, 3), even if there is a metaphor IDEAS ARE FOOD, 
which allows a speaker of English to say that they “swallowed” or “digested” an idea, there is 
no such expression as a “fried idea” or someone “becoming overweight by thinking too much”. 
This is because there is no complete overlap between the domain of “ideas” and the domain of 
“food”. Firstly, if there were such overlap, the two domains would be instances of one and the 
same thing. Since the requirement for metaphor is similarity, which is distinct from equivalence, 
and since something is logically not similar but equivalent to itself, there is no metaphor where 
SD = TD. Secondly, because SD is similar to TD, there is a portion of their structures which is 
equivalent, which is where motivation arises from anyway. This has interesting consequences 
for Lakoff’s theory of metaphor, to be discussed later. 
In Johnson 1987 (note that their monographs have been published in the same year), mapping 
does not exist because of a processing necessity for understanding a structurally similar domain. 
Instead, the element of necessity is dropped, and Johnson claims that mapping between similar 
domains is active all the time. Whereas Lakoff 1987’s gestalts constitute similarity, Johnson’s 
gestalts limit the mapping from two domains which are similar prior to the processing of their 
gestalt properties. For example, when discussing the THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS metaphor 
(Johnson 1987, 107), he mentions how it is only the visually similar aspects of SD and TD that 
“generate permissible imaginative expressions for theory construction” (emphasis mine). In 
other words, some SD and its TD are in a metaphorical ‘relation’ because they are similar in 
some way. However, what part of TD is structured in terms of SD is licenced by the matching 
of gestalt properties; in this case (all of Johnson’s cases, to be precise), it is the gestalt perceived 
through sight, specifically the image schema.  
Now: the end result of mapping from SD to TD as described by either Lakoff or Johnson is 
actually the same. Specifically, only that part of the SD which is structurally similar to a part 
of the TD is projected, and it is also only that part of TD which is structurally similar to the SD 
that gets projected onto (keep in mind that one TD can draw from various SDs). However, it is 
the entire process of metaphorical mapping that is of interest here, not just the end result. For 
this reason, while Johnson’s work is not to be disregarded in any way, it is Lakoff’s theory 
which I shall be pursuing henceforth.  
There are two reasons for this. The first is that when seeing a structure that projects and needs 
to be limited by natural “rules”, so as not to overgenerate, one is reminded immediately of 
Government and Binding theory. Not that there is anything wrong with that per se, but since 
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Johnson 1987 does not show any psychological proof that the metaphorical process is indeed 
such, and since cognitive linguistics is, roughly speaking, the functional answer to formal 
linguistics’ generative paradigm, one has reasons to be suspicious when anything cognitive 
reminds one of formal theories. The second reason is that Johnson 1987 does not explain why 
SD and TD are similar. Lakoff 1987 does so precisely by employing gestalts, whereas they 
explain why only a certain portion of SD is mapped to TD while the domains are already similar 
in Johnson’s theory. Lakoff 1987 is able to explain this as well––through the concept of 
motivation. This lack of explanation of the origins of similarity in Johnson 1987 therefore seems 
to be the predicament due to which Lakoff’s theory is superior in its explanatory power.  
Lakoff insists on this theory in his subsequent works as well (for example, “Metaphorical 
mappings are fixed correspondences that can be activated, rather than algorithmic processes 
that take inputs and give outputs” (Lakoff in Ortony (ed.) 1993, 218)), never deviating from the 
idea that similarity and motivation are the roots of structural correspondence between SD and 
TD. Let us now look at both these concepts in more detail. 
It is often the case that metaphor and conceptual metonymy are described in the same literature, 
sometimes even one after another. One therefore often sees described the source and target in 
metaphor as similar, and in conceptual metonymy as contiguous. Kurt Feyaerts has also used 
this strategy in a passage quoted below:  
 
 “Metaphor […] consists of a systematic projection of ontological, image schematic as 
well as logical structures from a source domain onto a target domain, whereby in addition to 
this primary feature the relationship between both domains can be characterized in terms of 
similarity. Metonymy, on the other hand, involves a contiguity relationship, which can be 
expressed by several specific associative relationship. […] the function of metonymy is 
traditionally determined as causing a referential shift, through which a salient conceptual 
structure is used to access a less prominent concept” (Feyaerts in Barcelona (ed.) 2000, 64) 
 
Feyaerts is saying that SD is not connected with TD in any way prior to metaphorical mapping, 
whereas conceptual metonymy, the conceptual process where, roughly speaking, a salient part 
of a certain domain stands for the entirety of the domain, that is, only puts one part of the domain 
at the forefront. For example, a dehydrated runner may upon returning home go directly to the 
fridge and drink chilled water. Then, another person comes in with the same intention but 
cannot do so because the runner had “drunk the whole bottle”. Obviously, it was not the bottle 
which was drunk, but its contents. Using the CONTAINER FOR CONTENTS metonymy, these 
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lines were able to economically convey to the reader that the entire content of the bottle of 
chilled water were the sought-after object of the two people. In effect, nothing new was 
conceptualized through conceptual metonymy––the contents of the bottle, although not 
necessarily the most accessible part of the bottle, are nevertheless quite accessible to human 
senses and require no mapping to become a feasible thought. This is quite distinct from what 
metaphor does: “future” is as such not a feasible thought unless it is conceptualized in terms of 
“being in front”. Whereas metonymies create nothing new, only allow “access to a less 
prominent concept”, metaphors allow novel conceptualization by providing (a part of) the 
structure for the new TD. 
Metonymy can therefore help one access another part of the same domain through the one that 
is more readily accessible. It can do so precisely because there is already some commonality 
between the two parts: they are contiguous, they already share conceptual structure and do not 
require one another to exist. On the other hand, the SD and TD are similar in structure because 
TD is only accessible through this similarity, which, as Lakoff has shown, is perceptual in origin 
but can be mapped elsewhere if there is motivation for such mapping. The TD is then, 
obviously, not part of the same domain as the SD (see the discussion on the difference between 
equivalence and similarity above), and it is also novel with regard to the SD: this is the reason 
why metaphors have the power to create new reality. 
When it comes to motivation, however, providing a definition is not as simple because there is 
no analogous property against which it can be described. Obviously, this motivation is different 
from what “motivation” has come to signify in everyday use: one cannot simply will a metaphor 
into existence.3 Neither can a group of people of a given size do so, which is something one 
would perhaps expect given the social component to language and the phenomena such as 
ideologies. Even if all the people in the world decided to think really hard that “future” is 
“behind”, or that “anger” is “cold”, this would likely not work. This is because motivation draws 
on biological and cultural factors, and has repercussions for linguistic change as well as present-
day linguistic reality.  
Motivation has already been described as having rendered arbitrariness and predictability no 
longer two contradictory notions, but contrary ones on two ends of a continuum. Whatever is 
in-between is more or less motivated. Whatever is closer to arbitrariness is then less motivated, 
and whatever closer to predictability is more motivated. The factors in increased motivation 
therefore indicate that something is more likely to be the case. The set of factors is termed 
                                                          
3 Actually, one might; however, metaphorical expressions are in this thesis understood to be part of linguistic 
systems more widespread than idiolects.  
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“correspondence” in the following quote by Lakoff, which is the earliest term used in the 
literature quoted and shall therefore be used throughout this thesis: 
 
“In our cognitive model of a window there is both an opening in the wall and a glass-filled 
frame fitting into it. The correspondence provides motivation for using the same word to refer 
to both. In isolation, an opening in the wall doesn’t have much if anything in common when a 
glass-filled frame. […] The fact that the opening in the wall and the glass-filled frame have 
been brought together  to fit one another physically and to correspond to one another in the 
same cognitive model seems to make them members of the same cognitive category[.] (Lakoff 
1987, 417) 
 
From this, it is possible to infer that whenever two entities appear together so frequently that 
one automatically brings up the association to another, one motivates another. However, at face 
value, little more can be deduced from this quote. After all, window frames and openings in 
wall actually physically correspond, in the sense that one physically accompanies the other in 
almost every case (and that if one is lacking, something is wrong with the window). But while 
“heat” does accompany “anger”, “ideas” don’t accompany “food” and “future” does not 
necessarily accompany “being in front”: in a still life, an apple may be in front of a basket, but 
no concept of time or idea is evoked. However, what Lakoff means here is that in our culture, 
openings in windows have glass in them, which is seen everywhere. He therefore implies that 
there are cultural and biological factors to motivation. 
Furthermore, as Sweetser (1995, 3) points out, motivation is not limited to a linguist’s intuition. 
This can be interpreted in two ways. One is that what a linguist has observed in their data may 
not actually turn out to be motivation––which is part of an answer of RQ1 here, and follows 
naturally from what has been said of motivation until now. The other is that it is not only in the 
minds of linguists that a sense is motivated, but, crucially, in the minds of ordinary people as 
well. The meanings our words select are motivated whether we are aware of it or not. In Michael 
Reddy’s article on the conduit metaphor, which has since its publication been hailed as a 
precursor to the classical theory of metaphor by Lakoff himself (in Ortony 1993, 202ff), the 
author has alluded to the fact that “[m]erely becoming cognizant of [processes involved in 
metaphor] in no way alters the situation.” (Reddy in Ortony (ed.) 1993, 176) As a consequence, 
it does not matter if one is falsely or correctly aware of what motivates a metaphor or not: in 
none of the four outcomes, the metaphors in one’s mind will not be altered. This also has 
19 
 
important consequences for understanding the psychological reality of metaphor (see section 
3.1). 
The biological factors of correspondence which provide the basis for motivation have already 
been mentioned above; it is the experiential basis humans receive from interacting with the 
environment through our senses. Still, it is important to know that this is motivation, not 
prediction: just because there is correspondence between what is experienced and another 
domain, this does not mean that there will necessarily be mapping between the two. In Lakoff’s 
words: “Experiential bases motivate metaphors, they do not predict them. Thus, not every 
language has a MORE IS UP metaphor, though all human beings experience a correspondence 
between MORE and UP.” and “What this experiential basis does predict is that no language 
will have the opposite metaphor LESS IS UP.” (Lakoff in Ortony (ed.) 1993, 241). With this in 
mind, it is easy to see that “future” is likely to be conceptualized as “being in front” as whatever 
is in front of someone will be reached at a later time than it was first perceived. It is also easy 
to see that “future” cannot be “behind”, as predicted, because we simply never experience 
“future” and “behind” together––they do not correspond biologically. The same goes for 
“anger” and “cold”.  
Nevertheless, even highly motivated ideas are not entirely predictable. It has, for example, been 
documented that Mandarin expresses time in terms of verticality (Boroditsky 2000). Thus, 
despite high correspondence with one domain in certain languages, a TD may be conceptualized 
in a different language through another SD with which it shares correspondence. 
Culture-based knowledge is also very often a contributor to the correspondence. Since human 
cultures are so diverse, there is no wonder that, on one hand, there will be differences in 
conceptualizing various TDs through different, but corresponding SDs. On the other hand, it 
appears that large numbers of people belonging to different cultural backgrounds make use of 
the same SD to express a particular TD. For example, LIFE IS A JOURNEY is widely present 
throughout the cultures of the Judeo-Christian tradition, together with its entailments, namely 
that God is a guide, and there are alternative paths in life, some being good and some evil 
(Lakoff and Turner 1989, 10).  The cultural aspect is also emphasized by Zóltan Kövecses when 
he compares metaphors from the West and the East of Europe (Kövecses 2006).  
Finally, one has to be aware that correspondence between the perceptual experience or culture-
based knowledge, and the TD may not always exist. In fact, in prototypical cases, there will be 
such correspondence (Sweetser 1995, 29; “correlation” is used there in the same sense as 
“correspondence” in Lakoff 1987), but in less prototypical cases, some of it may be less 
prominent or even non-existent. This, of course, does not trouble the theory of metaphor; in 
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fact, because conceptually salient domains are its basis, different levels of ontological and 
epistemic (Lakoff 1987, 386f) correspondence between prototypical and less prototypical 
members of the two domains is actually expected.  
To recapitulate: metaphor is the name for structural correspondence of two similar domains, 
which are made similar precisely because of this correspondence. Furthermore, the 
correspondence is neither arbitrary nor predictable but more or less motivated, subsuming 
biologically sanctioned experience as well as culture-based knowledge in the set of 
correspondences which account for similarity. Gestalts are not the only perceptual stimuli 
which sanction metaphorical mapping, but they are one of the structures which bring about 
motivation based on experience. In case of FUTURE IS IN FRONT, the motivation arises from 
visually perceiving movement relative to the speaker, with the moving thing reaching the 
speaker (or vice-versa) at a later time than it was perceived first, although cultural factors are 
also observed, since the Mandarin-speaking culture bases its conception of time (and thereby 
the future) in terms of verticality, not horizontality.  
Incidentally, let us reconsider this idea that the conception of time automatically also includes 
the conception of future. It is true that they belong to the same domain, but does this necessarily 
imply the relation of entailment? The answer is no, and it is possible to empirically prove this 
with many examples. Consider food and drink: they are felt to belong to the same domain, yet 
IDEAS ARE FOOD does not transfer well to ?IDEAS ARE DRINKS. People and animas also 
belong to the same category of living beings, but there is no metaphor operating at a level where 
humans and animals are treated as equals, let alone one which would include plants or fungi. 
However, for FUTURE IS IN FRONT, it does seem to be the case that it exists as a metaphor 
because of TIME IS SPACE, a more “general” metaphor which links past, present, and future 
with spatial concepts. Consider “What were you doing at 3PM?”, “Our meeting has been 
pushed back.” and “Good times are just around the corner.” The italicized items all refer to 
spatial arrangement, yet are used for describing time. The final example happens to refer to the 
future––it is an instance of both TIME IS SPACE as well as FUTURE IS IN FRONT. How so? 
Admittedly in a different context (when discussing which part of SD is mapped onto the TD), 
Lakoff has construed the concept of metaphorical entailment: “[a mapping] can carry over 
details of that knowledge from the [SD] to the [TD]. We will refer to such carryovers as 
metaphorical entailments. Such entailment are part of our conceptual system. They constitute 
elaborations of conceptual metaphors.” (Lakoff 1987, 384) What this means is that whatever 
knowledge, or experience, connected with the concept in the SD, is included in the structuration 
of the TD as knowledge or experience pertaining to it as well. In TIME IS SPACE, the fact that 
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greater distance between two things entails more space between them is carried over as the fact 
that greater distance between two things entails more time between them. In THEORIES ARE 
BUILDINGS, the fact that buttressing the building entails that it is less likely to fall carries over 
as the fact that buttressing the theory entails that it, too, is less likely to fall. Of course, this all 
has to be done in accordance with the extent of the similarity between the two domains––
returning to one previous example, eating too much food does entail gaining weight, but in spite 
of IDEAS ARE FOOD, thinking too much does not entail the same.  
Metaphorical entailments are then also mappings, but ones that are in some way contingent on 
a mapping on a more general level. The idea of subordinate and superordinate metaphors, 
however, is not dealt with in connection with entailment, but completely separately. Lakoff and 
Turner speak of generic-level and specific-level metaphors. The former “do not have fixed 
source and target domains, and they do not have fixed lists of entities specified in the mapping” 
whereas the latter do, and “[e]ach specific-level schema has such generic-level structure, as 
well as a structure at the lower, specific level.” (Lakoff and Turner 1989, 81f) Their example 
for a generic-level metaphor is EVENTS ARE ACTIONS, with LIFE IS A JOURNEY being a 
specific-level metaphor. Every specific-level metaphor is therefore much better defined in terms 
of what it helps or enables to conceptualize, but no specific-level metaphor can exist without a 
more general mapping providing it with an a priori structure. Adding to that, it is not the case 
that every specific-level metaphor is immediately subordinate to a generic-level one; rather, 
entailment may work in a chain: TIME IS SPACE entails FUTURE IS IN FRONT, which 
entails NEAR FUTURE IS CLOSER IN FRONT and so on. The fact remains, however, that 
entailment and subordination are related concepts when it comes to metaphor. 
Kövecses also noticed how metaphors are hierarchically organized, but in a manner which 
already implies entailment. In an article describing the scope of metaphor (the differences 
between metaphors in terms of how many TDs does a single SD map onto), he differentiates 
between simple and complex metaphors:  
 
“complex metaphors […] are constituted by the corresponding submetaphors […] By contrast, 
these submetaphors will be said to be simple, in that they are the ones that make up complex 
ones and they characterize an entire range of specific-level target concepts. […] In sum, simple 
metaphors constitute mappings in complex ones.” (Kövecses in Barcelona (ed.), 90; emphases 
in the original) 
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Without directly referring to entailment, possibly for his opposition to the formal in semantics, 
Kövecses recognises the relationship between simple metaphors and complex metaphors to be 
such that if some simple metaphors exist, the complex metaphor they make up exists as well. 
His account also differs from the one by Lakoff and Turner in that he gives primacy to simple 
metaphors, corresponding to specific-level metaphors, which (as a set) entail complex 
metaphors. In the other account, generic-level metaphors are those without which specific-level 
metaphors cannot exist, and they are therefore the ones entailed. 
The issue with their account is that it is impossible to determine the relation between FUTURE 
IS IN FRONT and TIME IS SPACE. The latter is certainly not a generic-level metaphor, 
because it has a concrete SD and a concrete TD, as well as a list of entities it specifies, even if 
it is not fixed. On the other hand, it is not enough to say that FUTURE IS IN FRONT, PAST 
IS BEHIND, HERE IS NOW, NEAR FUTURE IS CLOSER IN FRONT etc. entail a complex 
metaphor TIME IS SPACE, simply because no list of these specific-level metaphors will suffice 
to cover how complex the domain of time is. The English tense system is able to encode future-
in-the-past, past-in-the-past and past-in-the-future––if time can only lend itself to us for 
understanding through space, which is the idea behind TIME IS SPACE, and if no simple 
metaphor with FUTURE IN THE PAST as its target domain exists, how, then, is a speaker of 
English able to grasp, lexicalize and even grammatically encode such concepts?  
With neither of the accounts entirely satisfactory, Kövecses’ notion of submetaphor and its 
derivative superordinate metaphor will be used when describing relationships between 
metaphors. Furthermore, if that will transpire to be the case, a metaphor will be said to entail 
another. Finally, there seems to be no reason to dispute the claim that generic-level metaphors 
give structure to their submetaphors, so this will be accepted as fact. This leaves FUTURE IS 
IN FRONT as a submetaphor of TIME IS SPACE, and also superordinate to NEAR FUTURE 
IS CLOSER IN FRONT, FAR FUTURE IS FURTHER IN FRONT and so on. The diagrams 
where FUTURE IS IN FRONT and everything it entails is schematized and exemplified can be 
found in section 5. 
 
3.1 METAPHOR AND PSYCHOLOGICAL REALITY 
 
In their early work, Lakoff and especially Johnson (cf. Lakoff and Johnson 2003, 185-225; 
Johnson 1987) pay much attention to the concept of embodiment. This concept is the result of 
their realization that it is not just the brain but the entire body that contributes to the experience 
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which is then mapped onto TDs, and that, as a consequence, cerebral activity is the same when 
speaking about an action or thing and when one is using or sensing (i.e. seeing, touching, 
hearing, etc.) this action or thing.  
They, alongside many other cognitive linguists, also insist on the primacy of metaphor as a 
cognitive process first, which is only of interest to linguists because of the repercussions it has 
for language. Consider the following quotes (note also that the year of their publication is 
always later than the one of Lakoff 1987 and Johnson 1987): 
“[T]here is an important theoretical issue at stake in these examples: metaphor 
resides in thought, not just in words.” (Lakoff and Turner 1989, 2) 
“It is a system of metaphors that structures our everyday conceptual system, 
including most abstract concepts, and that lies behind much of everyday language.” 
(Lakoff in Ortony (ed.) 1993, 204) 
“Conceptual metaphors are knowledge structures in our minds, rather than in 
language per se, although they facilitate language use. And, crucially, what this 
demonstrates is the embodied nature of our minds.” (Evans 2014, 183) 
The issue I take up with these works is that they all agree with the primacy of the cognitive, yet 
all the data they provide comes from linguistic evidence. In order to justify this, they would 
need to produce a convincing argument explaining how and why certain linguistic evidence can 
conclusively point toward the psychological reality of the cognitive basis of metaphor. 
In fact, several such arguments are in place, but they are typically dispersed or limited to one 
work or one researcher. Johnson, for example, argues that despite the fact that metaphorical 
expressions in everyday use are based on a part of the SD, the unused part can still be activated 
in atypical situations––hence, novel metaphorical expressions should be understandable to 
people if there is really a correspondence between the SD and the TD, and the selected unused 
part does remain within the scope of similarity and motivation (for example, describing a theory 
as a “fortress” or “having cracks in its walls” should be at least vaguely understandable to 
speakers of English through THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS, although these expressions are 
untypical). However, Evans provides the most scientific argument, but one which has the least 
to do with language:  
 
“[A]utomatic and instantaneous activation of the brain region that processes hammering, when 
we also talk about a hammering event, would constitute an embodiment directly: a directly 
observable trace of the embodied nature of concepts when we use language. And embodiment 
24 
 
effects would provide a direct means of confirming Lakoff and Johnson’s contention that 
concepts are embodied.” (Evans 2014, 185) 
 
In order to prove beyond reasonable doubt the existence of FUTURE IS IN FRONT with 
Evans’s method, one would therefore first have to scan their experimental subjects’ brains when 
they would be processing space visually, and then compare the scan with the one made when 
the subjects would be talking about space. In the second step, one would need to get the subjects 
to speak about time while scanning their brain, and compare the active regions with those active 
at the time of speaking about space. With the first step, if the regions matched, one would prove 
the embodiment of SPACE. With the second step, if they matched, one would prove the 
correspondence of TIME and SPACE. Having tested a statistically significant segment of the 
English-speaking population, one could extrapolate one’s results onto the entire population, 
thus legitimately claiming TIME IS SPACE and thereby FUTURE IS IN FRONT are 
psychologically real metaphors.   
Planning such an experiment is, circumstantially, wishful thinking. For that reason, this 
subsection is concerned with the arguments making use of novel expressions. However, there 
is one implicit argument connecting linguistic and psychological realities of metaphor which 
has not been discussed yet. I would like to term it “abundance”.  
The argument is as follows. Whatever may have been the intentions of early researchers 
concerned with metaphor, their main source of data was always linguistic performance. As time 
progressed, they were able to uncover systems of superordinate metaphors and submetaphors 
which would become ever more intricate, and explain an increasing amount of utterances, 
especially in combination with metonymy (cf. Barcelona in Barcelona (ed.) 2000). As corpora 
were researched, correspondences between SDs and TDs were adjusted so that consistent 
mappings could be described, and eventually, it has become accepted that those metaphors 
which are useful for describing one domain in terms of another are actually the metaphors 
people live by. In other words, if relatively large quantities of expressions could be explained 
with the metaphor linguists came up with, the motivation to actually prove the metaphor 
psychologically would be low, especially seeing as this is tedious and expensive work. It seems 
to be accepted that a metaphor is real if there is no better way to explain the correspondence 
between the metaphorical expressions pertaining to both domains. Hence, the larger the number 
of metaphorical expressions is, the more real the metaphor seems. For this reason, I believe the 
term “abundance” to be doing justice to the idea because it truthfully describes the state of 
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affairs and still contains an element of disenchantment with the lack of actual psychological 
proof.  
Sweetser’s argument that data from comparative linguistics corroborate the psychological 
reality of present-day metaphors also implicitly assumes abundance. After all, the data she 
operates with can only be linguistic––dead people’s brains cannot be scanned for activity. 
Nevertheless, this approach offers more than just “bare” abundance: she claims evidence from 
earlier versions of English, and other languages from where metaphorical expressions would 
come into English, provide further evidence for the psychological reality of a metaphor 
(Sweetser 1995, 33). Hence, if something is ensuing, which is ultimately related to Lat. sequor 
“follow”, it is reasonable to assume that its spatial meaning was being mapped onto the TD of 
FUTURE because it has to do with being “in front”. Subsequent is a similar case, describing a 
temporal event in contemporary English but having spatial roots in Latin.  
Finally, let us shed light on elaboration of metaphors. Johnson is very explicit regarding this 
matter when discussing THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS: “The fact that only certain expressions 
are appropriate in talking about theories, and the fact that extensions into the unused part of the 
source-domain [sic] generate permissible imaginative expressions for theory construction give 
evidence of the existence of such underlying metaphorical systems in our understanding. If 
there weren’t such metaphors, we could not explain the appropriateness of the novel 
expressions.” (Johnson 1987, 107) This is exactly what has been claimed above: the unused 
part of the SD can always be activated (pending motivation and similarity) to elaborate further 
parts of the TD. Lakoff, too, recognises the possibility of elaboration: “the words and fixed 
expressions of a language can elaborate the conceptual metaphor” (Lakoff 1987, 384; emphasis 
in the original), but he exemplifies this claim with stewing and simmering as being special 
instances of anger, which is licenced by ANGER IS HEAT. While Johnson focusses on novel 
metaphorical expressions, Lakoff merely comments on some submetaphors of ANGER IS 
HEAT.  
If one decides to pursue Johnson’s thoughts, one might be met with the objection based on 
Reddy’s claim that awareness of a metaphorical mapping is irrelevant for its existence. If a 
novel expression is given to an informant who is asked to comment on how well they understand 
it, could it be that they are being made aware of the metaphor, at least to some extent? This may 
in fact tell the researcher more about an informant’s ability to find patterns rather than show if 
a metaphor is part of their conceptual system. However, another pre-classical theorist of 
metaphor, Donald Schön, provides a solution. Schön was researching the inception of novel 
metaphors with very limited scope (in the quoted case, the TD was paintbrush bristles). He 
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claims that it was not the case that similarities between different SDs (CARRIER OF PAINT, 
PUMP) and the TD were noticed prior to the emergence of mapping. Rather, it is “preanalyitic 
knowledge” (Schön in Ortony (ed.) 1993, 142f) which was leading the producers in looking for 
similarity with other domains. In terms of cognitive research, motivation has a biological and a 
cultural basis, but in terms of how normal humans react to a novel expression, their strategy of 
looking for similarities may well be preanalytical. Thus, when presented with a novel 
expression, informants will probably not try to comprehend the cultural and bodily basis in their 
cognitive system, but look for similarities without analysing the phenomenon in front of them.  
To conclude this section, allow me to point out how the precursors to classical literature on 
metaphor have had a significant impact on how metaphorical mapping is to be understood, and 
also on how it might be possible to prove that the metaphors we live by are psychologically 
real. In the next section, the focus is on FUTURE IS IN FRONT––methods for testing for 
abundance and comprehension of novel metaphorical expressions are contextualized in 
different research on psychological reality, elaborated for the purposes of this thesis and, finally, 
concretized for this specific metaphor.  
  
27 
 
4. METHODOLOGY 
 
Based on the conclusions from the previous section, there can be a reasonable amount of 
certainty behind the claim that FUTURE IS IN FRONT is a psychologically real metaphor if, 
on one hand, speakers of English find it relatively easy to comprehend novel metaphorical 
expressions based on that particular metaphor and, on the other hand, if there is an “abundant” 
system of existing metaphorical expressions in contemporary English that are apparently based 
on this metaphor. This section describes the methods used to infer both abundance as well as 
comprehension of novel metaphorical expressions. 
Testing for the latter is more straightforward because it yields direct evidence. Whenever a 
sentence containing a novel metaphorical expression is presented to an informant, they should 
provide a judgment of comprehension. However, informants are expected to be biased towards 
rejecting the novel expressions since they will typically have been faced with linguistic 
judgment in environments where there was a “correct” or “expected” answer alongside an 
aberrant one. Simply put, when regular people are asked “Do you understand this sentence?” 
they tend to understand the question as “Is this correct according to a prescribed usage?” 
instead of their own opinion. To counteract this bias, two measures have been taken. 
The first measure concerns the input of answers. Obviously, if there is a bias towards rejecting 
novel expressions and only two options, rejecting and accepting, are given to the informant 
when presented with a novel expression, the expected result will lean towards rejection more 
than the informants actually fail to understand the expression. Hence, there was a scale provided 
for them and they were asked to place their answer somewhere on a continuum. Each end of 
the scales was given a name in order to avoid confusion, for fear that even if people understood 
that “0-understanding” represents total incomprehension, they might have problems 
determining exactly what “6-understanding” meant. There were ten scales available, 
corresponding to “comprehension values” attributed by the respondents to the sentences. The 
choices of comprehension value for each sentence began with 0 and ended with 9. The two 
extremes were called “I don’t understand at all” and “I understand completely”. The expressions 
were chosen so that none signifies a different concept in the British or the American standard. 
The colloquial contracted forms were used to help dispel the aura of academic distance.  
The second measure concerns the guide to comprehension. There were concerns that 
“understanding” would translate to “correctness of syntax”, which is not what the survey was 
after. For this reason, the informants were explicitly asked to read instructions carefully, and 
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two sentences were given to them. The first one was rather usual while the second one was 
gibberish. They are constructed according to similar syntax: both are simple sentences with a 
transitive verb and contain two adjuncts: 
 
(A) John takes his children to school every day. 
(B) Marble cooks jagged beds under a tent silently.  
 
The informants were told that (A) should make sense to most speakers of English while (B) is 
likely to be nonsensical to most of them.  
Note also that (A) and (B) are not using FUTURE IS IN FRONT. That is because cognitive 
processing of the unused part of the IN FRONT domain could be made more difficult by 
priming the target with one of the versions (Athanasopoulos et al 2017, 5f; Boroditsky 2000, 
4). “Priming” refers to the positive cognitive effect some item has on the subsequent 
performance of subjects. If the subjects were primed with a metaphorical expression based on 
FUTURE IS IN FRONT before taking the survey, they would be expected to deliver better 
comprehension results because their brains would be more “used to” thinking in terms of this 
metaphor temporarily. Conversely, priming with a different metaphorical expression could 
conceivably cause the comprehension rate to deteriorate.  
In English, there are two versions of metaphors linking time and space, and consequently two 
versions of FUTURE IS IN FRONT: the ego-moving metaphor, where the speaker is the one 
moving through time, and the time-moving metaphor, where it is the time that moves while the 
speaker is static. The difference has been demonstrated with two linguistic examples: “We’re 
coming up to Christmas.” (ego-moving) and “Christmas is coming.” (time-moving) 
(Athanasopoulos et al 2017, 5). Priming the informants with an example would, on one hand, 
aid comprehension of novel expressions where the same version of metaphor as in the example 
is used, and impede it in the opposite situation. Neither of those are desirable, so each 
questionnaire contained novel metaphorical expressions based on one type of TIME IS SPACE, 
and examples were not based on any version of it. 
The sentences which the respondents have ultimately been presented with were based on the 
submetaphors of FUTURE IS IN FRONT discovered through corpus research (see below). The 
sentences containing metaphorical expressions based on only one submetaphor were expected 
to yield high comprehension values whereas those based on more submetaphors were expected 
to yield comprehension values still high in the absolute sense, but slightly lower than those 
described just now. One sentence was designed to be based on both ego-moving and time-
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moving versions simultaneously; I still expected its comprehension value to be reasonably high, 
but the sentence was nevertheless placed at the bottom of the survey in order to prevent any 
unwanted priming effect on subsequent examples. Speaking of “subsequent”, it was noticed 
that a large number of expressions pertaining to the future in English have Latin origins. Those 
have entered the English Lexicon in multiple stages throughout history and were likely not 
immediately used to describe the future (Fennell 2001). If the claim that linguistic knowledge 
is procedural rather than declarative, i.e. that speakers of English map from IN FRONT to 
FUTURE whenever they conceptualize and speak about the future, then they must also 
recognise the Latinate terms as pertaining to space when they use them to describe the future. 
At least for those with little knowledge of Latin, this is rather unreasonable to expect. To test if 
the Latin origin of spatial terms plays a role in their use for describing the future, three of the 
novel metaphorical expressions were Latinate terms. Two of those, “telescopic” and 
“locomotion”, are evidenced in the corpus while the final term, “sequendi”, is a made-up word 
based on the Latin gerund of the verb sequor “to follow” (which is also the basis for existing 
English words such as “sequence”, “subsequent”, etc.) All three of those sentences made use 
of the existing (discovered) submetaphors. The comprehension value for them was expected to 
be lower than that of other sentences, especially for the sentence containing “sequendi”. Finally, 
a failsafe was put in place to ensure that respondents were actually comprehending the 
sentences. For this reason, one sentence was based on a non-existent (in English) metaphor 
*PAST IS BEHIND. If the survey was to be valid, the comprehension value for this sentence 
had to be significantly lower than the average comprehension value of those sentences which 
were based on existing submetaphors.  
As per determining whether there is an abundance of metaphorical expressions of FUTURE IS 
IN FRONT or not, let us first raise an objection towards it: is it even necessary? A claim could 
be made that comprehension of novel metaphorical expressions on its own is enough to warrant 
the existence of a cognitive process with repercussions for linguistic behaviour. In the following 
paragraphs, reasons for including abundance are given, following the method for its description.  
In this thesis, abundance is displayed with two diagrams showing the relationships between 
FUTURE IS IN FRONT, its superordinate metaphor TIME IS SPACE with some of its other 
submetaphors, the submetaphors of FUTURE IS IN FRONT, some relevant submetaphors of 
those submetaphors and so on, the intention being to show all the entailment relationships 
within the system of this superordinate metaphor, and also to exemplify all the mappings since 
they were derived from these examples in the first place. The grammatical means of conveying 
the future are discussed separately in section 6. 
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The manner in which example sentences were chosen and the submetaphors in the diagrams 
organized is the following. No submetaphor was assumed to exist a priori; the idea was to 
assemble numerous example sentences from the corpus first and look for principles of their 
organization later. First, if any of the works cited in the bibliography mentioned TIME IS 
SPACE or FUTURE IS IN FRONT, the expressions which the authors deemed indicative of 
the mapping between the two domains were entered as search words into the corpus. This was 
done both to corroborate the authors’ original research and also to ensure that all researched 
expressions would be subjected to the same treatment: the criterion of sufficient frequency. It 
was assumed that the metaphorical expressions based on consistent mappings between a SD 
and a TD would appear more frequently in the corpus than those based on the one-off, non-
conventional mappings which are merely metaphorical extensions. The standard was set to at 
least two expressions within the first 600 hits (the first three pages of 200 results per page). If 
only one expression was found within this margin, or one of the two that were found was of 
dubious quality (i.e. the sentence was grammatically broken or incomplete; if the text in which 
the sentence was found was ideologically contentious, noticeably archaic, religious, etc.), more 
hits were examined. This process stopped if more than 1000 hits failed to yield two appropriate 
examples. The expressions chosen were at first various verbs of movement, then expressions 
semantically related to those as well as different more or less idiomatic expressions pertaining 
to the future. At that point, the amassed examples started to paint a clear picture of a diagram 
of submetaphors. When the SDs of the submetaphors were roughly established, I started to 
search for expressions semantically related to the lexical items denoting the SDs and included 
the examples found in this manner if they passed the frequency criterion. Naturally, throughout 
this process, modifications were being made: submetaphors were discarded on grounds of 
infrequent or unsystematic examples, dilemmas arose and were resolved with regard to whether 
an example belongs to the ego-moving or the time-moving version, and even one aberrant 
expression was found. The reader is advised to refer to section 6 for a detailed discussion.  
One positive effect of organizing the examples according to the organization of submetaphors 
is that the diagram can be thought of in terms of an expanded “dictionary entry” for this 
particular metaphor: it contains all the submetaphors of FUTURE IS IN FRONT that were 
discovered using the method described above, together with multiple examples. Not only does 
such organization show how expressions used for describing temporal relations can be very 
reasonably considered related in motivation and not random (arbitrary)––by observing these 
relations, the temporal sphere as expressed by English is easier to memorize and cognitively 
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simpler to process (see also Lakoff 1987, 438; 539). The diagram can be used for descriptive 
and also pedagogical purposes if one so desires.  
The other positive effect is, in my view, also theoretical, in the sense that simply confirming 
how novel metaphorical expressions are comprehensible, thereby confirming a strong 
indication of an underlying cognitive process, does not suffice on its own. This is because there 
is only a certain number of metaphorical expressions that can get evaluated by speakers––which 
is to say that only a certain portion of SD can without neuroscanning be considered related to a 
TD. For this reason, the more cognitive test of novel metaphor comprehension and the more 
linguistic test of describing the abundance metaphorical expressions best work hand-in-hand. 
Let me demonstrate this with two mental experiments. 
To show why abundance on its own is insufficient: imagine a tiny corpus consisting of “the sun 
rises in the morning” and “she got up as soon as she woke up”. From this, one can possibly 
infer the *UP IS EARLY metaphor, which does not exist because it was made up by me. Merely 
going through the corpus and enlarging the number of examples without any consideration for 
cognitive processes does not guarantee that the researcher will come across an existing 
metaphor at any time: what one can expect is linguistic correspondences, which are completely 
legitimate, but it is at the same time completely possible that metaphors they are not.  
To show why testing just for cognition in the manner used here is insufficient: one must imagine 
a limited field of analysis, limited in the same manner as a questionnaire with a small number 
of examples is limited, for it must be such because respondents will not spend large amounts of 
time solving linguistic questionnaires. Imagine therefore a mentally well-developed child which 
has never been schooled––it can use language well, only its syntax and vocabulary are relatively 
limited. They stay limited because it is placed into a forest for the entirety of its life, where it 
never speaks again. Let this child be bitten by a philosophical bug later in life, which makes it 
realize that some events and things it observes are more basic than the others, and that some 
notions are conceived in terms of more basic ones. It can thus contemplate metaphor in a very 
limited domain, just as a questionnaire can. The child, adept at killing animals for food, may 
observe that they drop when it kills them, that dead leaves fall from deciduous trees, and that 
dead flower petals also drop. It may by virtue of these observations come up with the idea that 
DOWN corresponds with DEAD. For the child, the correspondence may be perfectly valid, but 
it is only in its limited world that this is true––in the world where more than half of Earth’s 
population speaks some form of English, this will simply not do.  
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Because this account wishes to test for psychological reality in the whole wide world, it makes 
use of both tests. Thus, it should satisfy the “internal” criterion of cognitive plausibility and the 
“external” criterion of validity outside the domain of the experiment, at least to some extent.  
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5. RESULTS 
 
This section contains two diagrams displaying the organization of actual performance of 
English speakers based on FUTURE IS IN FRONT, and statistics based on the experiment 
where native speakers of English were asked to evaluate their comprehension of novel 
metaphorical expression based on FUTURE IS IN FRONT.  
The two diagrams correspond to the basic distinction between the ego-moving and the time-
moving version of FUTURE IS IN FRONT. The former version is laid bare first. The boxed 
expressions written in capitals represent the submetaphors of either version of FUTURE IS IN 
FRONT and the arrows represent the relations between them, so that the arrowhead is pointed 
towards the submetaphor and the tail stretches away from the superordinate metaphor. The 
italicized and enumerated examples in italics are all taken from the web-based EnTenTen15 
corpus, accessed via Sketch Engine, a software website containing various corpora which also 
enables users to search through them using adjustable queries. Items based on FUTURE IS IN 
FRONT, one of its submetaphors or superordinate metaphors, are underlined for greater clarity. 
In cases when two different metaphors are superordinate to a submetaphor, the relevant box has 
two arrows pointing to it from both the relevant superordinate metaphors. Most examples have 
been modified in order to spatially fit the diagram better. Various strategies have been employed 
for this purpose, but in the vast majority of cases, the subordinate clause has been omitted. In 
all other cases, the modifications are, as is customary, indicated with square brackets.  
In the analysis of the comprehension of novel metaphorical expressions, the sentences used in 
the survey are provided and linked to a specific submetaphor of FUTURE IS IN FRONT on 
which they are based. Then, the statistics of comprehension are given for each individual 
sentence. 
For a discussion of results, please refer to section 6. 
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5.1. ABUNDANCE OF FUTURE IS IN FRONT: EGO-MOVING VERSION 
        
 
 
  
  
TIME IS SPACE EVENTS ARE OBJECTS 
PAST IS BEHIND 
(1) It’s an 
opportunity to leave 
behind the pressures 
of the gaming 
industry. 
HERE IS NOW 
(2) Are we there 
yet? 
FUTURE IS IN FRONT 
(3) We will be setting out our 
detailed proposals in due 
course. 
NEAR FUTURE IS CLOSER IN FRONT 
(4) The future is nigh and it lives in 
Melbourne. 
(5) We therefore face the daunting reality 
that climate change is moving to the fore. 
(6) Are you more optimistic or more 
pessimistic about the immediate future? 
FAR FUTURE IS FURTHER IN FRONT 
(7) The only real end that is guaranteed is 
that one day in the faaar far far off [sic] 
future the Sun will go supernova. 
(8) Very long lives are not the distant 
privilege of remote future generations. 
(9) Just within a generation’s journey is a 
new horizon. 
EVENTS IN THE FUTURE ARE 
OBJECTS IN FRONT 
(10) And now you have years ahead of you 
[…] 
(11) As we draw near to another 
Christmas […] 
EVENTS TO 
HAPPEN SOONER 
ARE OBJECTS 
CLOSER IN FRONT 
(12) We are within 
touching distance of an 
historic agreement. 
(13) I do not see myself 
switching back to 
Windows in the 
foreseeable future. 
(14) [Teaching the 
gospel in China] seems 
well within reach. 
(15) He died just a 
couple of weeks short 
of his 98th birthday. 
EVENTS TO HAPPEN 
LATER ARE OBJECTS 
FURTHER IN FRONT 
(16) They had maybe 
talked about getting 
married at some distant 
point in the future. 
(17) Without an 
incremental ramping-up 
of climate goals, 2 
degrees [Celsius] will 
remain out of reach. 
(18) This was a far-
sighted initiative of the 
ministry. 
(19) I want to cry until 
the end of time. 
TIME LAPSE IS MOVEMENT 
(20) [I am] just approaching my 3rd year of sobriety […] 
(21) As we reach the 20th anniversary of the Beijing 
Platform for Action […] 
(22) Everyone is pushing to meet the summer deadlines 
for re-opening. 
(23) We’re just helping you with what you are destined 
to achieve. 
(24) She knows there will be many more taste-tests down 
the line. SHORT TIME LAPSE IS SHORT-DISTANCE 
MOVEMENT 
(25) We’ll see if I get around to finishing this one. 
(26) NASA may be closing in on one of the greatest 
scientific discoveries of all time. 
(27) My little darlings are entering adulthood. 
(28) He fell in love right off the bat. 
LONG TIME LAPSE IS LONG-DISTANCE 
MOVEMENT 
(29) It is common knowledge that prevention in the long 
run is cheaper than treatment. 
(30) Their protracted talks eventually led to a political 
settlement. 
(31) [The concept of a song may be] possibly accessed in 
the far-reaching future. 
 
FORCES MOVING ONE THROUGH TIME ARE 
FORCES MOVING ONE THROUGH SPACE 
(32) Khleifi and Sivan travel back through the 
present to a repressed and fragmented past only in 
order to be propelled forward again to a potential 
future. 
(33) Considering we’ve already sped through the 
first month of the year, it’s a question worth 
asking. 
(34) We’re hoping it will expand across America 
and the world as we sail towards a cure. 
(35) Action on other trade legislation is currently 
stalled. 
(36) Occupy Wall Street indicates that we’re 
inching towards revolution. 
(37) The employer dragged out the process for 
months. 
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5.2. ABUNDANCE OF FUTURE IS IN FRONT: TIME-MOVING VERSION 
 
TIME MOVES 
(38) As the meeting progresses, I feel myself at ease. 
PAST IS BACK 
(39) Cuba is such a 
colourful place […] 
that time left behind. 
HERE IS NOW 
(40) For another year 
she bided her time.  
FUTURE IS IN FRONT 
(41) Moscow confronts the prospect of real 
political instability.  
(42) Subsequent reports will be published 
approximately every three months.  
NEAR FUTURE IS 
CLOSER IN FRONT 
(43) The evening was 
at hand, and the day 
was past. 
(44) Ah, Valentine’s 
Day is near, and love is 
in the air. 
(45) Dry weather is just 
around the corner. 
FAR FUTURE IS 
FURTHER IN 
FRONT 
(46) The eviction 
suggest such a 
change is a long way 
away. 
(47) In those far off 
days, fish-eating was 
left to the very lowest 
class of society. 
(48) The cuts are 
scheduled to begin in 
January and spread 
out over ten years. 
FUTURE MOVES 
CLOSER 
(49) Everyone thinks an 
increase in the cost of 
carbon is coming.  
(50) As the summer 
approaches a number of 
callers contact the 
helpline to get 
information. 
(51) His life has been a 
successive string of 
disasters. 
(52) The time for the live 
concert show is drawing 
nearer. 
 
TIME-MOVING FORCES ARE OBJECT-MOVING FORCES 
(53) Collective courage extends this story into the twenty-first 
century. 
(54) The construction date has been pushed forward by twenty 
years. 
 
TIME MOVING QUICKLY IS 
OBJECTS MOVING QUICKLY 
(55) I am wishing that the next 8 years 
would hurry up and pass. 
(56) As the post-2015 agenda gathers 
momentum […] 
(57) Maybe that’s a good reason to 
speed up the timetable considerably. 
(58) Then I forgot about everything, and 
five days swept like five minutes. 
(59) These last few weeks have gone 
very quickly for me and the Training 
Period certainly hasn’t dragged. 
TIME MOVING SLOWLY IS 
OBJECTS MOVING SLOWLY 
(60) (= 59) These last few weeks have 
gone very quickly for me and the 
Training Period certainly hasn’t 
dragged. 
(61) The next few days crawled by 
interminably. 
(62) Christmas is slowly creeping in on 
us and is now only 15 days away! 
(63) Friday was a fairly slow day. 
(64) The war dragged on for two more 
years. 
(65) This is a way to change things 
within Cuba in the absence of a 50-year 
old inert policy.  
 
THINGS PROLONGING THE WAIT ARE 
PHYSICAL OBSTACLES TO MOVEMENT 
(66) Myth #4: Operators are holding back the 
future. 
(67) The reform procedure […] stumbles from 
deadlock to deadlock with apparently no 
resolve. 
EVENTS ARE OBJECTS 
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5.3. COMPREHENSION OF NOVEL EXPRESSIONS BASED ON FUTURE IS IN 
FRONT 
 
The data was obtained through a web-based survey which was sent to native speakers of English 
through e-mail or social media. The recipients were also asked to share the survey with other 
native speakers with whom they are in close contact, which in some cases they did. There was 
no discrimination among the recipients on the basis of country of residence (and therefore the 
standard spoken), gender, age, education or other social variables. To the best of my knowledge, 
none of the recipients had received any formal education in linguistics, so their knowledge 
about conceptual metaphor, and the relationship between psychological reality and 
comprehension of novel metaphorical expressions should be minimal or based on common 
sense only. Those recipients which turned into respondents were in the end invited to leave 
comments related to whatever they thought they wanted to express. This method is almost 
completely uncontrollable but sometimes yields interesting or relevant information.  
There were thirty respondents in total before I stopped accepting responses. All thirty 
respondents evaluated all ten sentences of the survey.  The data for each sentence is given 
below, namely the average comprehension value (Avg), the standard deviation from the average 
(σ), and the median value (Me).  
 
1. The deadline for this project is rolling downhill towards us. 
Submetaphor: TIME-MOVING FORCES ARE OBJECT-MOVING FORCES 
Avg = 7.77  σ = 1.71 Me = 9 
 
2. The government is preparing food reserves in case of some telescopic catastrophe. 
Submetaphor: FAR FUTURE IS FURTHER IN FRONT 
Avg = 6.57 σ = 2.01 Me = 6.5 
 
3. I wish I could shift the wait for our test results a couple of gears. 
Submetaphor: TIME MOVING QUICKLY IS OBJECTS MOVING QUICKLY 
Avg = 6.16 σ = 2.19 Me = 6 
 
4. The last week of summer is so close that if you turn around, it’ll smash right into your face. 
Submetaphors: NEAR FUTURE IS CLOSER IN FRONT, FUTURE MOVES CLOSER 
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Avg = 8.2 σ = 1.27 Me = 9 
 
5. If you work hard, a promotion is looking at your back from afar. 
Submetaphor: *FUTURE IS BEHIND 
Avg = 4.8 σ = 2.76 Me = 5.5 
 
6. The news of his sister’s disease would have been incoming for days before they reached him. 
Submetaphor: FUTURE MOVES CLOSER 
Avg = 5.26 σ = 2.46 Me = 5 
 
7. Why does the locomotion of the end of your shift feel so much faster on Friday than on 
Monday? 
Submetaphor: TIME MOVING QUICKLY IS OBJECTS MOVING QUICKLY 
Superordinate metaphor: TIME MOVES 
Avg = 5.53 σ = 2.64 Me = 6 
 
8. An opportunity for a new beginning was gliding towards them on a yacht. 
Submetaphor: FUTURE MOVES CLOSER 
Avg = 6.87 σ = 1.89 Me = 7 
 
9. After a night of heavy drinking, I always suffer its usual sequendi 
Metaphor: FUTURE IS IN FRONT 
Avg = 4.16 σ = 2.98 Me = 3 
 
10. The key to success is tailgating your big break. 
Superordinate metaphor = TIME MOVES [time-moving] 
Subordinate metaphors = TIME LAPSE IS MOVEMENT, EVENTS TO HAPPEN SOONER 
ARE OBJECTS CLOSER IN FRONT [ego-moving] 
Avg = 5.5 σ = 2.91 Me = 6 
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6. DISCUSSION 
 
As can be observed in the diagrams from sections 5.1 and 5.2, the well-documented metaphors 
TIME IS SPACE and TIME MOVES (Lakoff and Johnson 2003, Lakoff and Turner 1989, 
Boroditsky 2000, Athanasopoulos et al 2017, etc.) were used as starting points for an initial 
sketch of possible submetaphors and the relations between them. While TIME IS SPACE is 
implicit in TIME MOVES, it becomes clear that the analyses of both metaphors have to be 
separated since there are examples where notions pertaining to time are used but the scene is 
clearly static––time is not moving in those scenarios, and furthermore, even of the scene were 
to “move into action” and become dynamic, it would be one of the participants in the sentence 
(usually the agent or the patient) that would move, not the time itself (cf. (4–9). On the basis of 
that, the distinction was made between the “static” scenarios described by PAST IS BEHIND, 
HERE IS NOW and FUTURE IS IN FRONT which all naturally follow from the 
conceptualization of time as a type of linear movement, and the “dynamic” scenarios described 
by TIME LAPSE IS MOVEMENT.  
When it comes to the time-moving version, however, no such distinction has, or indeed can be 
made since the movement of time is implicit in the conceptual basis of this metaphor. The 
movement can be very slow or long, as for example in (46), but the scene is nevertheless 
conceptualized as dynamic. Still, since time can only lapse towards the future and not 
backwards, future as being in front is implied in TIME LAPSE IS MOVEMENT anyway, 
meaning that the ego-moving version actually contains two different conceptualizations of the 
future in front. For this reason, the relations between submetaphors in the diagram from section 
5.1 are more complicated than those in 5.2, which can immediately be seen from the number of 
arrows and boxes.  
The ego-moving version is further complicated by the fact that it does not happen often that 
future in general is understood to be in front––rather, there is a specific event towards which 
one moves or is oriented. For this reason, the notion of EVENT must somehow be reconciled 
the physical domain of SPACE. The metaphorical relation between the two domains has been 
attested many times in terms of the EVENTS ARE OBJECTS metaphor. When this metaphor 
is taken into account together with FUTURE IS IN FRONT, one can naturally arrive at the 
conclusion that EVENTS IN THE FUTURE ARE OBJECTS IN FRONT. This is the third and 
final submetaphor from this diagram that is also a superordinate metaphor.  
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Staying with the ego-moving version, there is a common principle underlying the relation 
between submetaphors of these “superordinate submetaphors”, namely the distance between 
the moving (or static) entity and the future. If what is in front is the basis for conceiving future, 
then it makes sense that what is closer in front is also “closer”, in the sense of reachable more 
quickly, in the future. Conversely, what is further away is also not immediately reachable in 
terms of time. Therefore, one is not surprised when one realizes that there are a plethora of 
sentences indicating the following: the static version of FUTURE IS IN FRONT entails NEAR 
FUTURE IS CLOSER IN FRONT (see (4–6)) and FAR FUTURE IS FURTHER IN FRONT 
(see (7–9)); the version that combines with EVENTS ARE OBJECTS also gives us EVENTS 
TO HAPPEN SOONER ARE OBJECTS CLOSER IN FRONT (see (12–15)) and EVENTS TO 
HAPPEN LATER ARE OBJECTS FURTHER IN FRONT (see (16–19)); and the dynamic 
scene yields SHORT TIME LAPSE IS SHORT-DISTANCE MOVEMENT (see (25–28)) and 
LONG TIME LAPSE IS LONG-DISTANCE MOVEMENT (see (29–31)).  
For the psychological reality of the ego-moving version, this systematicity might spell good 
news. The test of comprehension of novel metaphorical expression (used for the time-moving 
version of FUTURE IS IN FRONT) is valid because the respondents recognise something they 
agree with in the example sentences––something they have agreed with before taking the 
survey. Therefore there must be a connection between the psychological reality of a process 
and the preanalytic ‘making sense’ of it. Therefore, if the submetaphors and also their                
sub-submetaphors seem to naturally follow from their superordinate metaphors, make sense to 
us, and we therefore agree with the constellation of relations when it is presented to us, this is 
likely a good indication that the submetaphors are in fact psychologically real.  
The final submetaphor of the ego-moving version which has not been mentioned yet deals with 
the source of movement towards the future. It was dubbed FORCES MOVING ONE 
THROUGH TIME ARE FORCES MOVING ONE THROUGH SPACE and has a special 
status among submetaphors because it does not naturally follow from TIME LAPSE IS 
MOVEMENT. It also encompasses a rather diverse assembly of expressions. For example, the 
forces of movement can be expressed by verbs of either external (“propel” in (32)) or internal 
(“expand” in (34) or “inch” in (36)) propulsion, and the movement can be described as slow 
(“stall” in (35) or “drag out” in (37)) or fast (“speed through” in (33)), or even indifferent to 
speed altogether, like “sail” in (34).  
On the basis of examples (32–37), one is tempted to derive even more submetaphors––like ?A 
FORCE MOVING TIME IS EXTERNAL PROPULSION, or ?FORCES MOVING TIME 
SLOWLY ARE FORCES MOVING OBJECTS SLOWLY and ?FORCES MOVING TIME 
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QUICKLY ARE FORCES MOCING OBJECTS QUICKLY. However, one must keep in mind 
what Lakoff and Johnson have postulated at the beginning of their research on metaphors: it is 
not the case that every part of the source domain is used to elaborate the target domain. There 
may even be some “isolated and unsystematic” expressions making use of certain parts of the 
source domain, but this does not mean that they are actually metaphors we live by (Lakoff and 
Johnson 2003, 52–55). Thus, a handful of sentences that seem to indicate that forces moving 
time slowly are conceptualized as forces moving objects slowly do not yet a submetaphor make. 
Those expressions are in fact rather rare: browsing thousands upon thousands of corpus 
examples containing verbs pertaining to slow movement could have perhaps yielded more 
examples, but cherrypicking examples is scientifically a dishonest method. Furthermore, 
elaborating the target domain with unused parts of the source domain in this manner will give 
one more reason to believe that the original mapping is psychologically real, not that every 
elaboration can be a special target domain. It is therefore the case that elaborations of the forces 
moving one through time slowly, quickly, externally, internally, etc. are indicative of the 
existence of the domain of FORCES MOVING ONE THROUGH TIME, not of its potential 
submetaphors precisely because the examples making use of those expressions are rare and 
unsystematic.  
What is more, there are very many expressions verbalizing the speed of the passing time in 
terms of movement in the time-moving version of FUTURE IS IN FRONT (cf. (55-67)). On 
the other hand, very few expressions using this version of the metaphor pertain to the length of 
the movement as opposed to its speed. It is evident from the diagram in 5.1 that the ego-moving 
version contains two elaborate submetaphors on the second level, SHORT TIME LAPSE IS 
SHORT-DISTANCE MOVEMENT and LONG TIME LAPSE IS LONG-DISTANCE 
MOVEMENT, which do in fact encode movement in terms of distance. It therefore seems that 
speakers of English use the ego-moving version when they speak of the length of the movement 
of time, and the time-moving variant when speaking of the speed of this movement.  
This thesis is unfortunately not able to provide a definitive answer to the question why this is 
so, but it might be connected to the more overarching attribute distinguishing the time-moving 
version from the ego-moving version of FUTURE IS IN FRONT: the perception of the 
movement. While it is the animate participant that moves in the ego-moving version, they act 
only as the observer of a movement independent of themselves in the time-moving version. 
When one moves, one tends to think in terms of distance covered, whereas seeing other things 
move enables us to perceive their speed––this is where the reason might lie.  
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The other important characteristic of the time-moving version is the already mentioned intricacy 
of the system of submetaphors concerning forces of movement, and the lack of a “static” 
scenario since the conception of time in TIME MOVES necessarily includes movement. For 
this reason, the diagram in section 5.2 is less branched out than its counterpart in section 5.1. 
Looking at the examples pertaining to FUTURE IS IN FRONT in both versions of the diagram, 
it is difficult to see why exactly some examples should be classified as ego-moving instead of 
time-moving, or vice versa. In fact, the difference only becomes truly discernible in some 
submetaphors (compare TIME LAPSE IS MOVEMENT and examples (20-31) with FUTURE 
MOVES CLOSER and examples (48-52)) whereas others seem to lack relevant distinction. 
Compare (7) and (44), repeated here as (68) and (69): 
 
(68 = 7) The only real end that is guaranteed is that one day in the faaar far far off [sic] future 
the Sun will go supernova. 
 
(69 = 44)  Ah, Valentine’s Day is near, and love is in the air. 
 
“Far” and “near” future can be used to describe scenarios where either time or a participant is 
moving and the future is in front. Out of context, it can be argued that the sentences are 
impossible to classify as based on the ego-moving or the time-moving version beyond all 
doubt––“Sun going supernova” and Valentine’s Day can either approach us or be approached 
by us. However, (68) was made as a comment on the direction into which humanity is 
developing, and as such was clearly ego-moving in its conception. Conversely, (69) was a store 
clerk’s comment on the passing days and the proximity of a holiday, so it was certainly 
conceived as time-moving. Classification is therefore indeed possible, but sometimes difficult 
to achieve. With that in mind, sentences were chosen to exemplify the ego-moving versions of 
NEAR FUTURE IS CLOSER IN FRONT and FAR FUTURE IS FURTHER IN FRONT if the 
moving entity was an animate object, like in (5) and (6), pertaining to the domain of animate 
objects, like in (8) and (9), or personified, like in (4). In other cases, they were chosen to 
exemplify the time-moving versions of the two submetaphors.  
Both of these submetaphors differ somewhat from FUTURE MOVES CLOSER in that they, 
first, have yielded many examples where the distance between the moving entity and the 
observing entity is clearly described as being far or near, and in that these examples do not 
emphasize movement even if they presuppose it. Distance being the content of the sentences 
based on the ego-moving version more often than those based on the time-moving version has 
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already been explained so it need not be readdressed here. Emphasis on movement, however, 
is simply a matter of using expressions entailing movement, and those not entailing movement. 
Compare (45) and (52), repeated here as (70) and (71):  
(70 = 45) Dry weather is just around the corner. 
(71 = 52) The time for the live concert show is drawing nearer. 
In both sentences, time does move because its conceptual structure necessarily includes 
movement, but in (71), this is much more pronounced than in (70) because on its own, “drawing 
nearer” entails movement while “is just around the corner” does not. The claim is made for 
FUTURE MOVES CLOSER to be distinct from the other two submetaphors of FUTURE IS 
IN FRONT because of this difference, because of the relative infrequency of corpus examples 
where movement and short distance are both clearly present as opposed to the ones where only 
short distance between the moving entity––time––and the observer are clearly present, as well 
as because of three novel metaphorical expressions and the manner in which native speakers of 
English reacted to them (see below).  
When combined with EVENTS ARE OBJECTS, TIME MOVES yields the very productive 
submetaphor TIME-MOVING FORCES ARE OBJECT-MOVING FORCES, which seems to 
be divided into further submetaphors where the amount of force is translated into the speed of 
movement through space and consequently, through time. Thus, FORCES MOVING TIME 
QUICKLY ARE FORCES MOVING OBJECTS QUICKLY (see (55–59)) and FORCES 
MOVING TIME SLOWLY ARE FORCES MOVING OBJECTS SLOWLY (see (60–65)) are 
suggested by a large amount of related expressions in various sentences. In addition, the 
experiential basis for them is quite readily available to us––applying greater force onto an object 
will make it move faster or into a different direction. A primitive example of this is pushing or 
pulling things around; a very elaborate example of this was formulated by Sir Isaac Newton in 
his three laws of motion.  
There appears to be another psychologically real submetaphor of TIME-MOVING FORCES 
ARE OBJECT-MOVING FORCES which has to do with how the prolonged lapse of time is 
conceptualized as a block in physical movement: THINGS PROLONGING THE WAIT ARE 
PHYSICAL OBSTACLES TO MOVEMENT. Thus, a future event may be “held back”, may 
“stumble” or be in a “deadlock”, which are all originally terms pertaining to space––see (66) 
and (67). 
This submetaphor is peculiar because of two reasons. One of them is that in opposition to 
obstructing it, facilitating physical movement does not translate well into terms of time––I was 
unable to locate any expression to corroborate a proposed submetaphor ?THINGS 
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SHORTENING THE WAIT ARE THINGS FACILITATING MOVEMENT. This is probably 
because things commonly act as obstacles while not very many are able to facilitate it––rockets 
are an example, but those can hardly be the basis for a metaphor we have lived by for ages, and 
the relevant property of a rocket is the force it emits, not its being a thing. The other reason why 
this particular submetaphor is special is the fact that it is not indispensable for conveying the 
idea of the cause of a longer time lapse––terms like “wait” and “delay” allow the speakers to 
express this just fine. This can be a counterargument to the claim that all future is necessarily 
conceptualized in terms of being in front, and as such that all time is conceptualized in terms of 
movement in space.  
On that note, there was one expression related to the future I encountered which was in no way 
connected to being in front, and that was “right away”. It describes immediate future, but I am 
unable to see how this is connected to being in front, either when the ego is moving or when 
the time is moving. This is also an argument against movement in space being a necessary 
conceptual prerequisite of time.  
Because TIME MOVES was the metaphor I have encountered more frequently than TIME IS 
SPACE, I chose to test the psychological reality of the time-moving version of FUTURE IS IN 
FRONT. The respondents to the survey were indeed most helpful––not only did they 
collectively answer in accordance with the general premises of this thesis, seven of them also 
left comments providing some insight into how they tackled the problem in front of them. The 
discussion now turns to this.  
There are altogether nine expressions of Latin origin in the diagram in section 5.2 due to which 
the example sentences can be interpreted as in something “being in front”: confront, prospect, 
subsequent, approach, successive, extend, momentum, interminably, and inert. Sentence 2 used 
“telescopic” which is used to describe a long distance, sentence 7 used “locomotion” which 
simply describes movement, and sentence 9 used “sequendi” (cf. section 4) which can be 
glossed as “that which follows”. Sentence 5 was based on *FUTURE IS BEHIND as a check 
for validity. Finally, as has been mentioned, sentence 10 combined both the ego-moving and 
the time-moving versions of FUTURE IS IN FRONT and was placed last in order not to 
interfere with any sentences following it through the priming effect. 
As expected, sentence 5 which was based on *FUTURE IS BEHIND yielded low average 
comprehension value compared to the rest: its comprehension value was 1.42 points lower than 
the average comprehension value (based on the average comprehension value of all sentences 
but sentence 5). However, it was apparently polarizing in terms of opinion rather than 
consistently understood poorly, at least based on the relatively high median value (5.5 out of 9) 
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and a high standard deviation (2.76). In fact, sentence 9 with the made-up Latinate term 
sequendi fared considerably worse––not only was its comprehension value even lower than that 
of sentence 5 (4.16 compared with 4.8), its median value was also surprisingly lower (3) and 
the dispersion signified by standard deviation even higher (2.98). Plainly, this tells us that on 
average, a group of native speakers understood a sentence based on an existing metaphor 
considerably worse than the one based on a non-existent one. 
On the other hand, comparing the sentences containing Latinate words with their counterparts 
without Latinate words (at least in the parts where FUTURE IS IN FRONT is relevant) offers 
the following results. Sentences 1, 3 and 7 were based on TIME-MOVING FORCES ARE 
OBJECT-MOVING FORCES and its submetaphors. Their average comprehension value was 
6.48 and the average median value 7. The values for sentence 7 which contained the Latinate 
“locomotion” were 5.53 and 6 respectively. The dispersion of results was also significantly 
lower in Latinate-less 1 and 3 than in 7: 1.95 versus 2.64. Similarly, sentences 2, 4, 6, 8 and 9 
were based on FUTURE IS IN FRONT and its submetaphors. The average comprehension 
value of those was 6.21 and the average median value 6.1. Separating the sentences into those 
where the metaphor is used with Latinate words and those where the metaphorical part is 
Latinate-less gives us the average values 5.37 and 4.75 (containing Latinate words), and 6.77 
and 7. In both cases, the comprehension values were significantly lower for sentences where 
Latinate words were used in the metaphorical expression. It is therefore most likely the case 
that native speakers of English did not think in terms of FUTURE IS IN FRONT in sentences 
2, 7 and 9 because they had trouble processing Latinate words outside their expected context, 
which is completely understandable. It also most likely explains a large portion of the reason 
why sentence 9 performed worse than sentence 5.  
Looking at these results from a different point-of-view opens up a much more exciting 
perspective: the comprehension values for all of the analysed submetaphors is closer to 9 than 
it is to 0, and the values only increase if Latinate words, a factor that weakens comprehension, 
are taken out of the equation. Furthermore, the median values for all sentences are typically 
high, in most cases 6 or 6.5. For two sentences, namely 1 and 4, they even climb to 9. This is a 
strong indication that the division of examples into submetaphors in the diagram in section 5.2 
makes sense, which is another way of saying that the submetaphors have passed the tests of 
abundance and novel metaphorical expressions. According to the theories in section 3, this is a 
strong argument in favour of the time-moving version of FUTURE IS IN FRONT being 
psychologically real.  
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This is further corroborated by some of the comments left by the respondents. Focussing on the 
bad first, the sentences were dubbed “unconventional or clunky”, “unconventionally phrased”, 
“some it [sic] looked like the wrong word had been placed in the sentence (like number 2)” and 
“always worded in a super weird way”. At face value such comments seem discouraging, but 
considering that all of these were followed by a clause resembling “[…] but I was able to 
understand them just fine,” and the fact that being awkward is a far cry from being 
incomprehensible, such comment actually invite one to the conclusion that the concept of the 
sentences makes sense, it is only the wording that is strange.  
Two comments call for more attention because they offer an insight into the inner workings of 
two respondents’ minds for the time when they were occupied with the survey. The first one is 
as follows: “I think I understood what the speaker was trying to say in every sentence, based on 
context clues. For example telescopic didn’t make sense in that sentence but based on the rest 
of the sentence I knew what you were trying to get across so I took that word on face value and 
assumed it meant ‘narrowly focused’ or ‘precise’”. This respondent used a strategy that was 
pragmatic in nature––they looked for clues in the context in order to make sense of the Latinate 
“telescopic”. However, the strategy did not lead them to the correct solution––the meaning of 
the word “telescopic” in their mental lexicon was not a compound of [tele-] and [scope] which 
would yield “characterized by looking from a long distance” when suffixed by [-ic]. Instead, 
the root was [telescope], the stargazing device, which caused them to infer “narrowly focussed” 
and “precise” when suffixed by [-ic] because they were familiar with the mechanics of looking 
through a telescope. It seems that at least this respondent used reanalysis to come to an 
unexpected conclusion about what sentence 2 means, which aided them in their unique 
understanding. 
While this comment can cast a certain amount of doubt over the validity of the results (the 
mechanism of reanalysis is not connected to mapping from the domain of IN FRONT onto the 
domain of FUTURE), the following comment serves to dispel it: “I’m not sure I did it correctly! 
But I used the following criteria to respond: a high comprehension if I could visualize a meaning 
[…] and low comprehension if I felt there was a contradiction or a vagueness to the meaning” 
(Emphasis mine.) What this comment describes is precisely the process which was theorized to 
be active during the comprehension of novel metaphorical expressions, except for the fact that 
it was apparently conscious. The respondent made use of their past experience acquired through 
interaction with the physical world to connect two different domains in order to make sense of 
the one which was not available to them through perception. Although other respondents did 
not report how they tackled the sentences, it is possible to say that if this was a commonly 
46 
 
employed strategy, the argument for the experiential nature of conception put forth by Lakoff, 
Johnson and others can be considered valid for this particular metaphor.  
Certain aspects of abundance call for further address. In example (7), the word “far” is repeated 
three times and the first instance of the word is spelled with four repeated vowels. Both 
repetition of words and repetition of vowels within a word (indicating a prolonged 
pronunciation) are common strategies for emphasis or even exaggeration, although typically 
associated with spoken discourse. In this particular case, the exaggeration or emphasis of 
distance through multiple instances of repetition appears to be mapped onto the domain of time, 
which means that that what is projected into the future which is not going to become present 
for a particularly long time, is conceptualized in terms of being a particularly long distance 
away in front. The person who produced this sentence must have been comfortable enough with 
the idea that FAR FUTURE IS FURTHER IN FRONT that even a particularly specialized part 
of the domain of IN FRONT could be mapped onto the domain of FUTURE without any need 
to explain to the addressee what is going on. If that is the case, they were also of the opinion 
that the sentence will be easily understood by their addressees. Certainly, this type of 
metaphorical expression is rather rare, but it might nevertheless be indicative of how strong the 
connection between IN FRONT and FUTURE is in the human brain.  
Another aspect worthy of discussion concerns the combinations of metaphors, submetaphors 
and metonymies within the same sentence. For example, (59) and (60) are the same sentence 
with different parts highlighted; the expression “have gone very quickly” is based on TIME 
MOVING QUICKLY IS OBJECTS MOVING QUICKLY while “have not dragged” is based 
on TIME MOVING SLOWLY IS OBJECTS MOVING SLOWLY. The clauses containing the 
two expressions are coordinated, which indicates at least a high degree of compatibility between 
the two submetaphors. In example (41), the comprehension of the sentence necessarily involves 
a metonymy, where “Moscow” the city first stands for the “institution in the city”, and then is 
metonymically reduced for the second time to mean “the city for the institution for the people 
in the institution.” None of these sentences appear to present much difficulty for their reader to 
understand.  
To the contrary, sentence 10 in the survey produced a relatively low average comprehension 
value (5.5, the median value was 6) with a high dispersion rate (σ = 2.91). It seems to have 
polarized speakers greatly––the individual comprehension values tended to congregate towards 
the extremes of the scale, so the respondents must have typically found the sentence mostly 
unproblematic or quite difficult to comprehend. In fact, the verb “to tailgate” presupposes two 
moving arguments, which in sentence 10 were the ego and some event in the future. Therefore, 
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both the ego and time were presented as moving. Since every other sentence only made use of 
one of the two versions of the metaphor, this was likely the cause for some of the respondents’ 
confusion. Therefore, it seems that multiple cognitive processes within the same sentence do 
not impede the understanding (the cognitive effort expanded may be greater, but people 
nevertheless can understand the end product) of such sentences, unless both versions of the 
metaphor, incompatible in their conceptual nature, are the multiple processes in question. 
The final part of this discussion is dedicated to the question whether FUTURE IS IN FRONT 
is indispensable for English speakers’ comprehension of future. Until this point the focus has 
only been on the lexical items and for this reason it was possible to conclude that the vast 
majority of expressions which have to do with the future are either submetaphors of one version 
of FUTURE IS IN FRONT or are influenced by the idea that future is in front (see examples 
under TIME-MOVING FORCES ARE OBJECT-MOVING FORCES, TIME LAPSE IS 
MOVEMENT and their submetaphors). There was one aberrant expression, “right away”, 
mentioned already and there may be others, but they appear to be rare. If, on the other hand, 
grammatical means for expressing the future are considered, the situation is altered 
considerably. In order to determine how essential this metaphor is for the future in English, 
futurates have been considered, some of them also from the historical point-of-view. 
In their discussion of the ways to express the future time in English, Huddleston and Pullum 
(2002, 208-210) argue that English lacks a proper future tense, claiming instead that there are 
a number of grammatical “constructions which select or permit a future time interpretation” 
(Ibid, 210). They include into this category the imperative and the mandative subjunctive 
moods, the present tense (aspect is not mentioned but the hierarchy of clauses is), and the non-
finite constructions following a verb of volition/intention: the bare infinitive, the to-infinitive 
and the “gerund-participial” (exemplified by “I intend/am [seeing her tomorrow].”) To this 
comprehensive list, one may add the “be about to” construction which is not discussed in the 
chapter on future time. The auxiliary “will” is extensively argued to be a modal verb rather than 
primarily a marker of (pure) future. The going-to construction is dealt with separately and is 
described as “idiomatic be going” (Ibid, 210ff, italics in the original).  
From this list, it is clear that there are in fact multiple grammatical constructions where no 
grammatical item has ever had a semantic quality that can in any way be reasonably associated 
with movement or orientation, and therefore with being in front. The imperative and the 
mandative subjunctive are reflexes of the West Saxon verbal paradigm, although they were 
never used exclusively for describing the future (Repanšek 2019). Old English, in fact, did not 
have a designated means of expressing the future present in verbal morphology; future was 
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instead conveyed by means of metonymic analogy between possession and necessity 
lexicalized with verb habban “to have”, similarly to Latin future construction with habere 
(Repanšek in conversation with the author; Hopper and Closs Traugott 2003, 61, 123). The use 
of present tense for the future depends on the context and cannot be considered 
grammaticalized. As for the non-finite forms following verbs of volition/intention, one could 
reasonably speculate that their future interpretation has arisen from the same source as the future 
interpretation of the construction with will.  
This source is located in the Middle English period (Fennell 2001, 105; Hopper and Closs 
Traugott 2003, 92). The latter shed light on the details of their grammaticalization. As inanimate 
objects which are logically incapable of volition started to be selected as external arguments by 
willen, “a new meaning was added to an already polysemous form, and thus new distributional 
possibilities were opened up for the form.” (Hopper and Closs Traugott 2003, Ibid) The 
“idiomatic be going” and the constructions with verbs of intention are still not equal in meaning 
in present-day English. This is because of their different metaphorical origins (Hopper and 
Closs Traugott 2003) in spite of the fact that the grammaticalization of both construction had 
been relatively contemporaneous (Fennell 2001, 105). 
First and foremost, while Huddleston and Pullum 2002 dub the construction the “idiomatic be 
going”, both Fennell 2001 and Hopper and Closs Traugott explicitly give it as “be going to”. 
Furthermore, Huddleston and Pullum claim that the “be going” is complemented by the to-
infinitive, although they admit that the “going” and the “to” are “virtually inseparable”, as 
evidenced by their phonological conflation into “gonna” /gǝnǝ/ (2002, 211). Hopper and Closs 
Traugott emphatically disagree––as they elaborate the exact process of grammaticalization of 
“be going to”, they also show the key role conceptual metaphor has played in it. 
They do not go into great detail when discussing the bodily basis for the metaphors they 
mention, but they do claim that spatial terms have first been “derived metaphorically” from 
body parts and then temporal terms from those spatial terms, providing us with many 
constructions, including the “be going to” construction (78f). Thus far, no reason has been given 
for preference of “be going to” over “be going” as the more correct version of historical 
development. But they go on to show that the mechanism of grammaticalization is based on 
contiguity as well as similarity––on metonymy just as much as metaphor (81). In the case of 
“be going to”, it was not just the spatial meaning of “go” that grammaticalized, it was rather the 
purposive meaning of the following “to” which grammaticalized together with the verb: “But 
in fact it was not go that grammaticalized; the phrase be going to did, presumably in very local 
contexts […]” (Ibid). Here, the metaphorical and metonymic processes can be seen working 
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hand-in-hand: there is no such thing as the movement of time, so there has to be structural 
similarity between time and space; hence, the “be going” part is indeed metaphorical in nature. 
But the purpose (goal) of this metaphorical movement is goal just as much as the goal of 
physical movement is a goal––there is contiguity involved, which is a metonymic process. 
Hopper and Closs Traugott show that reflexes of this original interaction between path 
(metaphor) and goal (metonymy) still persist because this construction cannot be used with 
agents incapable of intention (#This stone is going to remain here forever. (The sentence makes 
sense only if the decision is not up to the stone.)) or verbs which cannot be intended (#This 
soup is going to taste well. (This sentence is only sensible when uttered by the person making 
the soup.)) (Hopper and Closs Traugott 2002, 83) 
With this in mind, the conclusion which is probably the most realistic is that there is at least 
one grammatical structure for which FUTURE IS IN FRONT was necessary––the “be going 
to” construction. Whereas this metaphor was necessary for the construction, it was not 
sufficient; as was shown above, the purposive meaning entailed by the construction is 
contiguous with the goal of physical movement. The final task at hand is to match the 
construction with the submetaphors from the diagrams in 5.1 and 5.2. Consider the following 
examples (from EnTenTen15): 
(72) My birthday is going to be the most amazing time anyone has ever had.  
(73) My first week is going to be fairly busy. 
(74) We are going to continue to work closely with the medical community.  
(75) The secrets are going to come out.  
The construction works with both the time-moving version (72-73) as well as the ego-moving 
version (74-75), although the latter seems to be the more commonly used one. Movement is 
obviously a part of the mapping, so examples (72-73) could be included under the FUTURE 
MOVES CLOSER submetaphor while the examples (74-75) could be included as examples 
under TIME LAPSE IS MOVEMENT. They were not chosen to be examples since they are not 
as illustrative as those that have been included, and also because the role of metaphor in the 
grammaticalization of this construction is quite complicated. As for its psychological reality, 
while Huddleston and Pullum 2002 claim that “the meaning of motion and progressivity has 
been lost” (211), the fact that inanimate objects and verbs which do not allow a purposive 
reading are disqualified from being used in this construction indicates that the mapping between 
the temporal and the spatial domain is very much active, not to mention the contiguity between 
the purpose of an action and the goal of movement.  
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7. CONCLUSION 
 
In this thesis, the metaphor FUTURE IS IN FRONT was examined from the point-of-view of 
its psychological reality. Initially, several criteria for psychological reality have been found and 
considered on the basis of their validity and feasibility. Eventually, two were chosen, namely 
the comprehension of novel metaphorical expressions and an implicit assumption that there is 
no better explanation for the multitude of expressions that seem to be based on conceptual 
metaphors than the existence of said metaphors. The latter assumption was dubbed 
“abundance”. Relevant research for both criteria was conducted, the results were presented and 
later discussed. It is now time to readdress the research questions, which are repeated here for 
convenience: 
RQ1: Is FUTURE IS IN FRONT a psychologically real metaphor and how is it possible to 
determine this? 
RQ2: What concrete manifestations, meaning metaphorical expressions, of FUTURE IS IN 
FRONT are used by speakers of English? 
RQ3: Is FUTURE IS IN FRONT irrelevant, conducive, or essential towards the English 
speakers’ understanding of the concept of “future”? 
It is perhaps easiest to start with the answer to RQ2 since it is represented in diagrammatical 
form in sections 5.1 and 5.2. The division into two sections represents the basic cognitive 
division of the metaphor into the ego-moving version and the time-moving version, which 
oftentimes share a submetaphor, yet are fundamentally different because the time-moving 
version always implies movement while the ego-moving version does not. The moving entity 
differs with respect to each version as well. The diagrams are not congruent with one another, 
partly because the ego-moving version seems to provide more metaphorical expressions 
concerning the distance of the movement through time while the time-moving version has a 
more developed system of metaphorical expressions concerning the speed of moving time. 
In addition, Section 3 introduced Kövecses’s idea of submetaphors and hypothesized a 
hierarchy between FUTURE IS IN FRONT and its submetaphors so that one would eventually 
end up at FUTURE IS IN FRONT if one started at any given submetaphor and moved upwards. 
This is not the case. It is impossible to determine the hierarchical relation between, for example, 
TIME LAPSE IS MOVEMENT and FUTURE IS IN FRONT (ego-moving version), other than 
the fact they are both submetaphors of TIME IS SPACE. Time lapse in the latter seems 
nevertheless to be oriented towards a goal that is in front, but it would be a mistake to claim 
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that either is in a submetaphorical relationship with the other. Further research into the exact 
nature of the relationship between various submetaphors is certainly possible. 
When it comes to psychological reality, which is the subject of RQ1, this thesis can claim that 
a test has been carried out to check whether the submetaphors extracted from the diagram in 
section 5.2 actually exist in the brains of native speakers of English. Not only did the test 
confirm the organization of the submetaphors of the time-moving version that was constructed 
on the basis of the abundance of corpora examples, the respondents also offered some insight 
(albeit a limited one) into the thought process behind their active comprehension of novel 
metaphorical expressions. The time-moving version of FUTURE IS IN FRONT can therefore 
be claimed to be psychologically real, based on the abundance of metaphorical expressions it 
engendered and the ease of comprehension of sentences for native speakers when novel 
metaphorical expressions based on this metaphor were presented to them. Furthermore, one 
respondent reported visualizing the spatial arrangement between the arguments when actively 
comprehending, although all sentences were clearly temporal in meaning. Finally, three 
sentences contained novel metaphorical expressions lexicalized in Latinate terms. The 
comprehension value for those was significantly lower than for those using only present-day-
English lexis and morphology, which is further indication that the speakers do not merely infer 
from the context, but rather try to parse and establish connections between meanings of 
individual items––which is the phase where mapping would be expected to occur. 
However, one of the sentences in the survey was based on a non-existent metaphor *FUTURE 
IS BEHIND. In spite of this, the respondents reported on average a relatively high 
comprehension value, even though they were quite polarized on the issue (the average is slightly 
above the middle value at 4.8, the median is well above it at 5.5, and the standard deviation is 
at 2.76). Not only that––the comprehension values of sentences immediately below it in the 
survey fell significantly (to 5.26 and 5.33; the average comprehension value of sentences 1 
through 4 was 7.18!) This might have been a coincidence and the sentences after 5 were indeed 
less comprehensible, or the spatio-temporal nonsense of sentence 5 primed the respondents so 
that the subsequent sentences made less sense to them than they usually would. In a different 
reality, sentence 5 would have been omitted.  
Finally, RQ3 may be addressed. Sections 5.1 and 5.2 are sufficient proofs of the abundance of 
lexical expressions which are based on either version of FUTURE IS IN FRONT. In fact, only 
one aberrant expression has been found, “right away”, although I happily concede that there 
may be more. However, towards the end of section 6, grammatical means of referring to the 
future in present-day English were explored to see if FUTURE IS IN FRONT is truly 
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indispensable for future-time reference in the language. Unsurprisingly, it was discovered that 
not only was this not the case throughout the history of English, but also that even today, there 
is only one grammatical construction which is certainly based on FUTURE IS IN FRONT––
the “be going to” construction. There, metaphor and metonymy interacted to produce a scenario 
where movement and goal could be used to describe a future of a present intention or cause, a 
scenario which eventually grammaticalized and is even today inapplicable in cases where 
movement or purpose are logically excluded. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that FUTURE 
IS IN FRONT is very much conducive towards the conceptualization of future time in the 
English language, but far from indispensable for it. 
One area to which this thesis has paid little attention is the exact mechanisms of interaction 
between different metaphors, and metaphors and metonymies. Especially in the case of “be 
going to”, a more precise cognitive account of interaction between metaphor and metonymy 
would be most welcome. Future research can therefore pertain to relationships between 
connected submetaphors as well as to interaction patterns between various types of mapping.  
In its quest to come up with ideas as close to the actual truth as possible, humanity has 
discovered mathematics, logic, and somewhere along the way [!] also the fact that time is 
conceptualized in terms of space. A preanalytical knowledge of that, however, is available to 
any normal speaker of English––which perhaps makes this discovery all the more fascinating. 
Since normal humans are endowed with eyes, a wondrous device for interacting with space, it 
is no coincidence that space is a source domain for many a less-directly-available target domain. 
In view of this, I trust it will make sense to most when I say that this is as good a place as any 
other to stop. 
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POVZETEK 
Klasična teorija konceptualnih metafor, kot so jo postavili predvsem George Lakoff, Mark 
Johnson, Mark Turner, Zóltan Kövecses in Eve Sweetser, to opisuje kot preslikavo elementov 
z ene konceptualne domene (t. i. izhodiščne domene) na drugo (t. i. ciljno domeno), s čimer je 
ljudem pogosto sploh omogočeno dostopanje do te ciljne domene. Pri konceptualni metafori 
PRIHODNOST JE SPREDAJ gre torej za preslikavo izhodiščne domene »biti spredaj« na 
ciljno domeno »prihodnost«. Obe domeni sta podobni, ker se do določene mere ujemata v 
zaznavni strukturi, preslikava s »spredaj« na »prihodnost« pa je motivirana biološko (ljudje 
posedujemo organ zaznavanja prostora, ne časa) in kulturno (merjenje časa je vpleteno v tkivo 
delovanja v sodobnih družbah). Naloga, ki si jo je magistrsko delo zadalo, pa se tiče določanja 
psihološke realnosti dotične konceptualne metafore. 
Namreč, omenjeni raziskovalci so postulirali primat kognitivnega nad jezikovnim pri 
metaforah, vendar je zaradi izobilja izrazov, kjer materni govorci angleščine uporabljajo 
lekseme, ki sicer opisujejo fizično nahajanje spredaj ali gibanje od spredaj naprej, da opišejo 
prihodnost (»Christmas is coming/still far away/just around the corner itd.), obveljalo, da nič 
drugega kot kognitivni obstoj dotične metafore ne more pojasniti dejanskega stanja v 
jezikovni rabi. Optimalno bi bilo sicer dokazati, da so pri konceptualizaciji časa in prostora 
aktivni isti predeli možganov, vendar so zaradi težavnosti tovrstnih poskusov boljša izbira 
jezikovni testi. Pri Johnsonu 1987 sem našel test razumevanja izvirnih metaforičnih izrazov. 
Pri testu gre za izraze, osnovane na izbrani metafori, ki pa jih v dejanski jezikovni rabi ni najti 
ali pa so zelo redki. Če sta obe domeni res povezani, naj testirani osebki ne bi imeli težav pri 
razumevanju izvirnih izrazov, ki predvidevajo konceptualno metaforo, ki domeni povezuje.   
Ker izobilje izrazov psihološko realnost metafore samo predpostavlja, Johnsonov test pa 
zajema le omejen delež domene, iz katere je smotrno črpati izvirne metaforične izraze, je 
najbolje oba kriterija obravnavati skupaj. Tako sem tudi storil. Rezultat prečesavanja 
korpusov in iskanja izrazov, ki se nanašajo na prihodnost, sta dva diagrama, kjer so 
PRIHODNOST JE SPREDAJ, njene podmetafore in z njo povezane metafore razvrščene po 
medsebojnih logičnih odnosih, vsak diagram pa ustreza eni izmed inačic metafore – pri prvi je 
v ospredju akter, ki se lahko premika ali pa ne, pri drugi pa popredmeteni čas, ki se nujno 
premika. V nadaljevanju je 30 maternih govorcev angleščine vrednotilo razumljivost desetih 
povedi, osnovanih na slednji inačici PRIHODNOST JE SPREDAJ. 
Ključni rezultati so naslednji: diagrama vključujeta mnoge metafore, ki so poimensko enake, 
saj se razlikujejo samo z ozirom na (potencialno) premikajočega se akterja. Kljub temu 
prihaja do neskladja, saj inačico, osredotočeno na akterja, npr. uporabljajo govorci pri izrazih, 
ki naslavljajo razdaljo premika, inačico, osredotočeno na čas, pa tedaj, ko naslavljajo hitrost 
premikanja. Leksemov, ki se tičejo prihodnosti pa niso osnovani na tej konceptualni metafori, 
je malo (našel sem le »right away«), zato pa je več skladenjskih struktur, s katerimi je mogoče 
izraziti prihodnost, pa omenjena metafora pri njih ni relevantna. Prav tako sem zaznal izrazit 
padec pri stopnji razumevanja izvirnih latinskih izrazov, kadar so zaznamovali prihodnost, 
čeprav so izrazi z latinskimi koreni v angleščini, ki jih je mogoče tako uporabljati, dovolj 
pogosti (subsequent, successive, approaching itd). Nazadnje sem izpostavil strukturo »be 
going to«, pri kateri sta aktivni PRIHODNOST JE SPREDAJ ter konceptualna metonimija, ki 
v kognitivni ustroj prinaša koncept cilja. Oba procesa imata psihološko realnost, kar je jasno 
razvidno iz semantičnih omejitev, ki jih struktura ima.  
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